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New Essays on the Rationalists$
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Rocco J. Gennaro and Charles Huenemann

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780195165418

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195165411.001.0001

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Spinoza's Necessitarianism Reconsidered

Spinoza's Necessitarianism Reconsidered

(p.241) 11 Spinoza's Necessitarianism Reconsidered
New Essays on the Rationalists

Edwin Curley

Gregory Walski

Oxford University Press

In this paper, we defend the view that Spinoza is committed to allowing for the existence of a plurality of possible worlds, that his necessitarianism is merely moderate, not strict enough to exclude the possibility of other worlds (in the Leibnizian sense of the expression, which requires that a “world” include all the things existing at all times and not merely all the things existing at some time). To show that evidence for attributing strict necessitarianism to Spinoza is lacking, we shall concentrate on Don Garrett's article, “Spinoza's Necessitarianism,” in the conviction that his case for attributing strict necessitarianism to Spinoza is the strongest one available.

Keywords:   conditional necessity, Edwin Curley, determinism, finite mode, Garrett, moderate necessitarianism, necessitarianism, strict necessitarianism, sufficient reason, unconditional necessity, Gregory Walski

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