Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Deflating Existential ConsequenceA Case for Nominalism$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Jody Azzouni

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780195159882

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0195159888.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 26 March 2019

Criteria for the Ontological Commitments of Discourse

Criteria for the Ontological Commitments of Discourse

(p.49) 3 Criteria for the Ontological Commitments of Discourse
Deflating Existential Consequence

Jody Azzouni (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter refutes the two possible arguments for Quine’s criterion for what a discourse is committed to: (1) the triviality thesis, that “there is” as used in ordinary language indicates ontological commitment, and this idiom is straightforwardly regimented by the objectual existential quantifier, (2) that the semantics of objectual quantification presupposes ontological commitment. Seven strategies for supporting the triviality thesis are reviewed, including paraphrase in ordinary language and the pretense program.

Keywords:   paraphrase: objectual quantification, ordinary language, pretense, Quine’s criterion for what a discourse is committed to, the triviality thesis

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .