Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Randolph Clarke

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780195159875

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005

DOI: 10.1093/019515987X.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 19 June 2018

Active Control and Causation

Active Control and Causation

Chapter:
(p.15) 2 Active Control and Causation
Source:
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
Author(s):

Randolph Clarke (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/019515987X.003.0002

Noncausal libertarian accounts allow that a basic free action may be uncaused and have no internal causal structure. Views of this type advanced by Carl Ginet and Hugh McCann are evaluated here. These views fail to provide adequate accounts of the active control that is exercised when one acts freely and of the reason-explanation of free actions. Any satisfactory account of these phenomena must invoke causation.

Keywords:   action, causal theory of action, causation, control, free action, Carl Ginet, Hugh McCann, noncausal libertarian accounts, reason-explanation

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .