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Freedom and Moral SentimentHume's Way of Naturalizing Responsibility$
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Paul Russell

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780195152906

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195152905.001.0001

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Logic, “Liberty”, and the Metaphysics of Responsibility

Logic, “Liberty”, and the Metaphysics of Responsibility

Chapter:
(p.11) 1 Logic, “Liberty”, and the Metaphysics of Responsibility
Source:
Freedom and Moral Sentiment
Author(s):

Paul Russell (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195152905.003.0002

This chapter presents a critical discussion of the classical interpretation of Hume's compatibilist strategy. It argues, in particular, that the classical interpretation fails to provide a satisfactory account of why Hume held that his specific views about the nature of “necessity” puts the free will controversy in a “new light.” This leads to the conclusion that there is something wrong with the classical interpretation and its heavy emphasis on Hume's conceptual distinction between two kinds of “liberty”.

Keywords:   A. J. Ayer, compatibilism, conceptual analysis, Thomas Hobbes, indifference, libertarianism, liberty, necessity, Bertrand Russell, Moritz Schlick, spontaneity

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