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Autonomous AgentsFrom Self-Control to Autonomy$

Alfred R. Mele

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780195150438

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195150430.001.0001

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(p.257) References

Source:
Autonomous Agents
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Oxford University Press

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