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What Am I?Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem
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What Am I?: Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem

Joseph Almog

Abstract

This book articulates and defends Descartes's dual key project: the separation of human mind and body as distinct substances and their integration into a single human being. The central challenge faced by Descartes's dualism is the prove too much/prove too little dilemma: too keen a separation of mind and body gets in the way of reuniting them into a full bloodied real human subject, whereas emphasizing the primality of the full human being is not enough to preserve the distinctness of mind and body as separate complete substances.

Keywords: body, conceivability, Descartes, dualism, essence, Kripke, mind, necessity, substance, whatness

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2002 Print ISBN-13: 9780195146462
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003 DOI:10.1093/0195146468.001.0001

Authors

Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Joseph Almog, author
University of California, Los Angeles

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