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What Am I: Descartes and the Mind-Body Problem
Joseph Almog
Abstract
This book articulates and defends Descartes's dual key project: the separation of human mind and body as distinct substances and their integration into a single human being. The central challenge faced by Descartes's dualism is the prove too much/prove too little dilemma: too keen a separation of mind and body gets in the way of reuniting them into a full bloodied real human subject, whereas emphasizing the primality of the full human being is not enough to preserve the distinctness of mind and body as separate complete substances.
Keywords: body, conceivability, Descartes, dualism, essence, Kripke, mind, necessity, substance, whatness
Bibliographic Information
| Print publication date: 2002 | Print ISBN-13: 9780195146462 |
| Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003 | DOI:10.1093/0195146468.001.0001 |
