Not Passion's Slave: Emotions and Choice
Robert Solomon
Abstract
The idea that we are, in some significant sense (and to some significant degree), responsible for our emotions is an idea that Robert Solomon has developed for almost three decades, following the philosophy of Jean‐Paul Sartre. Here, in a single volume, he traces the development of this theory of emotions and develops it in detail. Two themes run through his work: the first presents a “cognitive” theory of emotions in which emotions are construed primarily as evaluative judgments. The second proposes an “existentialist” perspective in which he defends the idea that, as we are responsible for o ... More
The idea that we are, in some significant sense (and to some significant degree), responsible for our emotions is an idea that Robert Solomon has developed for almost three decades, following the philosophy of Jean‐Paul Sartre. Here, in a single volume, he traces the development of this theory of emotions and develops it in detail. Two themes run through his work: the first presents a “cognitive” theory of emotions in which emotions are construed primarily as evaluative judgments. The second proposes an “existentialist” perspective in which he defends the idea that, as we are responsible for our emotions, it follows that – in a limited sense – we “choose” them. While the first premise has gained increasing currency in the literature, his thesis on responsibility has met with considerable resistance: the new emphasis on evolutionary biology and neurology has reinforced the popular prejudice that emotions “happen” to us and are entirely beyond our control.
Keywords:
anger,
choice,
emotions,
feelings,
intentionality,
irrationality,
William James,
judgment,
neurology,
phenomenology,
philosophy,
purposiveness,
Robert Solomon
Bibliographic Information
| Print publication date: 2003 |
Print ISBN-13: 9780195145496 |
| Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003 |
DOI:10.1093/0195145496.001.0001 |