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The Oxford Handbook of Rationality$
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Alfred R. Mele and Piers Rawling

Print publication date: 2004

Print ISBN-13: 9780195145397

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0195145399.001.0001

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PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE PRACTICAL RATIONALITY

PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE PRACTICAL RATIONALITY

Chapter:
(p.57) chapter 4 PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE PRACTICAL RATIONALITY
Source:
The Oxford Handbook of Rationality
Author(s):

Brad Hooker (Contributor Webpage)

Bart Streumer

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195145399.003.0004

Hooker and Streumer distinguish procedural and substantive practical rationality thus: according to proceduralism, an agent is open to rational criticism for lacking a desire only if she fails to have a desire that she can rationally reach from her beliefs and other desires, whereas according to substantivism, an agent is open to such criticism not only if her desires fail procedurally, but also if they fail substantively, where, for example, an agent who lacks the desire to take curative medicine might be substantively irrational in virtue of this lack, and yet be procedurally rational because she cannot rationally reach this desire from her beliefs and other desires. Hooker and Streumer discuss the proceduralist views of Hume, Brandt and Williams, before turning to substantivist arguments. They conclude by noting the advantages of following Scanlon in being a proceduralist about practical rationality but a substantivist about practical reasons.

Keywords:   belief, criticism, desire, practical, procedural, reason, substantive

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