Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Book of Evidence$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Peter Achinstein

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780195143898

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195143892.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2017. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 19 November 2017

Final Definitions and Realism

Final Definitions and Realism

Chapter:
(p.168) 8 Final Definitions and Realism
Source:
The Book of Evidence
Author(s):

Peter Achinstein (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195143892.003.0008

A final definition of ”potential evidence” is proposed, and it is shown how veridical, ES‐, and subjective evidence can all be defined using the concept of potential evidence. Hempel's ”conditions of adequacy” for a definition of evidence are examined to see which ones are appropriate. Finally, it is shown that the definitions of the evidence proposed commit one to scientific realism, and that instrumentalist interpretations of evidence that employ the concept of an ”explanatory connection” will not be possible.

Keywords:   conditions of adequacy, ES‐evidence, evidence, explanatory connection, Hempel, instrumentalism, potential evidence, realism, subjective evidence, veridical evidence

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .