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LeibnizNature and Freedom$
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Donald Rutherford and J. A. Cover

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780195143744

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0195143744.001.0001

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Spontaneity and Freedom in Leibniz

Spontaneity and Freedom in Leibniz

Chapter:
(p.194) Spontaneity and Freedom in Leibniz
Source:
Leibniz
Author(s):

Michael J. Murray (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195143744.003.0011

This essay argues that Leibniz’s conception of moral necessity is based on accounts of the notion developed by late-16th century Spanish Jesuits — that moral necessity entails the denial of psychological determinism or the view that volitions are “causally necessitated by psychological antecedents”. An assertion of moral necessity presupposes the denial that an act of choice is either physically or causally determined by antecedent conditions, although such conditions may nonetheless be sufficient for choice. It presents evidence of anti-compatibilist sympathies in Leibniz’s thoughts.

Keywords:   Leibniz, spontaneity, freedom, anti-compatibilist

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