A Priori Warrant and Naturalistic Epistemology
Some definitions of naturalistic epistemology exclude the possibility of a priori warrant, but a more plausible definition leaves room for it. The general approach to warrant favored here is two‐stage reliabilism, which is reformulated from earlier papers. The present proposal is that belief‐forming processes of a “ratiocinative” sort may be a priori warranters if they are reliable, free of perceptual experience, and part of one's basic cognitive architecture. Cognitive science is relevant to determining the possibility of a priori warranters because it can shed light on the availability of belief‐forming processes that might meet the foregoing requirements. A review of scientific findings on arithmetic cognition suggests that these requirements are indeed met.
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