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Virtue, Vice, and Value$
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Thomas Hurka

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780195137163

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195137167.001.0001

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Merits and Implications

Merits and Implications

Chapter:
(p.29) 2 Merits and Implications
Source:
Virtue, Vice, and Value
Author(s):

Thomas Hurka (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195137167.003.0002

This chapter defends the recursive account by identifying in turn, attractive features of its two main elements: the recursive characterization of good and evil and the associated definition of virtue and vice. The chapter also discusses the value of personal relationships, whether virtue is found primarily in occurrent attitudes or in dispositions (the latter a view of Aristotle's), whether virtue must be voluntary, and how virtue relates to right action.

Keywords:   Aristotle, disposition, evil, good, personal relationships, right, vice, virtue, voluntary

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