Truth Before Tarski
After Sluga, after Ricketts, after Geach, after Goldfarb, Hylton, Floyd, and Van Heijenoort
I start from Hans Sluga's paper “Truth before Tarski”, in which he argues that the establishing of Tarski's approach to truth brought loss as well as gain to analytic philosophy: what was lost was our understanding of the problem of truth. To recover what was lost, he says, we must examine the variety of pre‐Tarskian views. My paper picks up that task and focuses on Wittgenstein's Tractatus. I interweave ideas borrowed from Thomas Ricketts, P. T. Geach, Warren Goldfarb, Peter Hylton, and Juliet Floyd, and thereby try to explain the relation between Wittgenstein's conception of sense and his view of truth.
Keywords: early analytic philosophy, Floyd, Frege, Geach, Goldfarb, Hylton, logic, negation, Ricketts, Russell, sense, Tarski, Tractatus, truth, Wittgenstein
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