The notion of “will” is analyzed from a historical and contemporary perspective along with a cluster of closely related notions: practical reason, choice, decision, intention, motives, acts of will, free judgments of the will (libera arbitria voluntatis), and the notion of the “voluntary.” Three senses of “will” are distinguished: “desiderative will” (what one wants, desires or prefers), “rational will” (what one chooses, decides or intends), and “striving will” (what one tries, endeavors or makes an effort to do). It is argued that the “will” in all three of these senses must be involved in an adequate account of “free will.”
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