Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Mobilizing for PeaceConflict Resolution in Northern Ireland, South Africa, and Israel/Palestine$

Benjamin Gidron, Stanley N. Katz, and Yeheskel Hasenfeld

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780195125924

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195125924.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2018. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy). Subscriber: null; date: 21 June 2018

Introduction

Introduction

Chapter:
(p.3) 1 Introduction
Source:
Mobilizing for Peace
Author(s):

Benjamin Gidron

Stanley N. Katz (Contributor Webpage)

Yeheskel Hasenfeld (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195125924.003.0001

Abstract and Keywords

Increasingly, scholars are recognizing that civil society is important to the prevention of conflict and peace keeping. Peace and conflict‐resolution organizations (P/CROs) are a form of civil society or nongovernmental organizations dedicated to promoting peace and ending violence. This chapter introduces an international comparative study of P/CROs in three protracted conflicts in South Africa, Northern Ireland, and Israel/Palestine, and justifies the choice of these conflicts. It describes the range of P/CROs studied, difficulties encountered during the study, and study issues, which include: the organizational characteristics of the P/CROs; the methods P/CROs employed; comparisons of P/CROs in the four countries; and the contributions P/CROs made to peace in their regions.

Keywords:   civil society, conflict resolution, Israel/Palestine, nongovernmental organization, Northern Ireland, peace and conflict‐resolution organizations (P/CROs), protracted conflict, South Africa, study issues

The place and role of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) dedicated to the promotion of peace and the resolution of intractable social conflicts is a newly emerging field of study to which we aim to make a contribution with this book. We hope to add to existing empirical studies—especially those from a comparative perspective—that inform us about the nature of these organizations, their accomplishments, and how the various social systems in which they operate influence their functions and structures.

We chose to study organizations that were trying to promote peace, reconciliation, and coexistence between peoples in societies that have known fighting and bloodshed for many years. The impetus for the study arose when significant breakthroughs in three major violent international conflicts occurred: the first cease‐fire between the Protestant and Catholic paramilitaries in Northern Ireland (1993), the unbanning of the ANC that led to the first democratic elections in South Africa (1994), and the Oslo Accords between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO; 1993). In all three regions these historic agreements were preceded by intense activity from nongovernmental/civil society groups and organizations, which advocated for peace, reconciliation, and resolution of the conflicts through nonviolent means, primarily during the 1980s. Some of these groups, such as Peace Now in Israel, Black Sash in South Africa, and The Peace People in Northern Ireland, often gained the attention of the international press; the founders of The Peace People, Mairead Corrigan and Betty Williams, won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1976. In all three locations, we quickly discovered that these more famous organizations were at the forefront of a broader phenomenon that included a wide range of groups, which we termed “peace and conflict‐resolution organizations” (P/CROs). These third sector/civil society organizations, many of which were initiated and managed by concerned citizens, shared the same general goal of promoting peace and an end to the violence but found different organizational means to express this objective.

It did not take long for us, working with our in‐country research partners, to discover that we were on to something. In each of the three regions, we discovered evidence of what one P/CRO leader called “magic moments.” Syl (p.4) Slabbert, one of the founders of Idasa in South Africa, noted that “For an NGO to be successful [it] needs a magic moment, otherwise it just dies.” Slabbert went on to observe that “the Dakar meeting was our magic moment.” He was referring to the fact that the Dakar Conference (held in Dakar, Senegal, in July 1987) organized by Idasa, brought together for the first time leading “white” intellectuals and politicians (mainly Afrikaner), and key African National Congress members “to begin the process of demystifying an organization which by the nature of its considerable support . . . was destined to play a major role in negotiations towards a non‐racial, democratic South Africa.”

A similar magic moment occurred in Israel with the origins of the important P/CRO, Peace Now. The specific event that encouraged the emergence of Peace Now was the impending journey of Prime Minister Menachim Begin to Washington to present President Jimmy Carter with a plan for future negotiations, which Begin considered to be potentially acceptable to the Egyptians. The trip came after several months in which no progress in the negotiations was achieved. A letter of protest to the Israeli Prime Minister was written by a group of 348 young Israeli IDF reserve officers. The letter indicated their dissatisfaction with his policies, mainly with his positions on the question of a territorial compromise in return for peace with Egypt. They hoped that the letter would reflect their apprehension that this policy and the ongoing occupation of the Territories might severely damage the Israeli national interest and the democratic nature of the country. The letter, later known as the Officers Letter, implied that if the prime minister did not respond to their demands the signers would “question the justification of Israel's way.” The letter received unexpected public and media attention and support, and served as the basis for the establishment of Peace Now and the new peace movement.

Something similar came about in Northern Island with the creation of a P/CRO named Peace Train. The idea to operate a Peace Train was in direct response to persistent and sustained attacks on the cross‐border rails service by terrorist groups and in particular the IRA. These attacks were having a significant detrimental impact not only on railway operations but also on the whole economic and social fabric of the province, and were costing jobs. At its worst, in one year alone (1988) cross‐border rail services were disrupted on 172 days during which time passengers had to be conveyed by bus for all or part of their journey. There was a gut feeling that destroying one of the major cultural, social, and economic links between Dublin and Belfast, the two capitals of the island, was wrong. There was something inherently appalling about that, and the issue needed to be addressed. The group which was regularly blowing up the line and putting passengers' lives at risk was the IRA, so it was necessary to confront them.

The Peace Train concept was initially an idea developed by a group of individuals who regularly used the Belfast‐to‐Dublin rail service. This group comprised prominent business people, politicians, academics, and trades‐union (p.5) officials from both sides of the border. A Peace Train committee was established in 1989. Mr. Sam McAughtry, a well‐known broadcaster from a Protestant unionist background, chaired the committee. Sam, who is currently an Irish Senator, was chosen because he was regarded as someone who worked extensively in both the north and south of Ireland and having no party affiliations was considered to be without “political baggage.”

Some of the full range of P/CROs we studied were advocacy organizations that attempted to influence public opinion—and policymakers indirectly—in order to change policies regarding the conflict. For example, the End Conscription Campaign (ECC) in South Africa engaged in a national campaign against drafting South African whites into the military, and the Council on Peace and Security in Israel, which was composed of high‐ranking veteran officers, engaged in lobbying and public speaking. Other P/CROs were professionally based organizations, such as Lawyers for Human Rights in South Africa, Physicians for Human Rights in Israel, or the Northern Ireland Council for Integrated Education. These groups approached the conflict and its toll from their professional perspectives, raising awareness of its costs (in terms of human rights, public health, education, etc.) but also providing services to those who were denied them because of the conflict. Some of the P/CROs focused on reaching out to the “enemy,” such as Women Together in Northern Ireland, Bridge to Peace in Israel, the Jerusalem Center for Women in Palestine, and the South African Institute of Race Relations. Such organizations created opportunities for human dialogue and joint ventures on an equal basis, thus demonstrating that a different paradigm for relations with the “other side” was possible. Still other organizations were engaged in consciousness‐raising, focusing on changing attitudes regarding the conflict. These included organizations such as the South African Catholic Bishops' Conference, the Justice and Peace Commission in South Africa, the Peace Train in Northern Ireland, and Rabbis for Human Rights in Israel. Finally, other P/CROs were research institutions or “think tanks” that produced studies on various parameters of the conflict. These included organizations such as the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (Idasa), the Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research in Israel, and the Centre for the Study of the Conflict in Northern Ireland.

We could not overlook the possibility that a relationship existed between the breakthroughs in the three conflicts and the P/CRO activity that preceded them. It was very intriguing to us that these groups and organizations, which at the time represented a dissenting view from the national consensus on how to deal with the “other side,” might have played a role—even if modest—in the three historic breakthroughs. Also of interest was the nature of these organizations in the different locales and the question of whether they shared certain common features, across countries and conflicts. In studying these organizations, could we learn any lessons that could be applied to other countries beset by protracted conflicts?

(p.6) In selecting the regions for our study we were mindful of similar conflicts in other parts of the world. Rwanda, Bosnia, Chechnya, and Afghanistan stand out as sites where violent conflicts have taken a terrible toll in terms of human lives and misery. In addition, the unresolved conflicts in Cyprus and Kashmir are potential powder kegs ready to explode at any time. Nonetheless, we recognized early in our research that P/CROs require at least a rudimentary foundation of democratic institutional and legal infrastructures, which were absent in many of these other regions. Moreover, this infrastructure must include an institutional capacity to promote civil society through the formation of voluntary associations. Given these criteria, we chose Israel/ Palestine, Northern Ireland, and South Africa for our study.

In approaching a comparative study of P/CROs, we identified three different levels on which to base our analysis: substance, form, and a comparison of the P/CROs. Concerning substance, recent literature on international con‐ flict resolution emphasizes “Track II Diplomacy,” which focuses on the roles actors outside of the government play in resolving conflicts. Thus, in all three regions we were concerned with the possible contribution these groups had made to the historic decisions to “change courses” in terms of dealing with the conflict, preferring peace and reconciliation to military force. With regard to form, these groups and organizations operated at a time when the third sector/civil society was experiencing tremendous expansion and growth in most societies and in practically all fields of activity. Since the P/CROs were part of that sector, we were interested in the unique characteristics that enabled them to participate in this expansion. Finally, we were interested in comparing these groups since they operated to further the same general goals during the same approximate time period, but nevertheless were involved in different conflicts and existed within different social and political contexts. Thus, we were interested in determining factors that could explain both the similarities and the differences in their characteristics.

Specifically, in this book, we (1) portray the organizational characteristics of peace/conflict‐resolution organizations; (2) explore the methods they used to achieve their goals within the political and societal contexts in which they existed; (3) compare the organizations across regions and conflicts; and (4) assess the P/CROs' contributions to society and to peace (and/or the resolution of conflict) in their respective regions, and specifically to the historical breakthroughs in the three conflicts.

Protracted Conflict and War

The second half of the twentieth century can be characterized as one of con‐ flict and war. Since 1945, over 150 armed conflicts have claimed an estimated 25 to 30 million human lives, not including the effects of famine and disease, (p.7) and humanity has experienced only twenty‐six days without war.1 Social conflicts, whether based on ethnicity, religion, economics, or territorial differences, are endemic to human life2 and range from disputes between individuals, organizations, and groups to international warfare and genocide. In some ways, social conflicts are necessary for the stability of a democratic society.3 Oppressed groups create situations of conflict to spark social change.4 Yet, social conflict can be dangerous in that when it turns violent, there is a chance that a cycle of violence will persist, sometimes for generations and even centuries, resulting in many victims, including innocent people who are not party to the actual conflict, and causing irreparable damage to society.

This is especially true in societies that experience intractable conflicts, where the price that both individuals and society pay is very high. Bar‐Tal has summarized the nature of such conflicts as: (1) protracted—they last a long time; the parties to the conflict accumulate hatred and prejudice; (2) perceived as irreconcilable—the parties involved view their goals as radically opposite; neither side sees the possibility of making concessions; they expect the conflict to last indefinitely; (3) continual—the parties to the con‐ flict have an interest in its continuation and make vast military, economic, and psychological investments that later impede its resolution; having vested interests in the conflict makes it difficult to change beliefs and behaviors; (4) violent—wars and terrorist attacks wound or kill soldiers and civilians, property is destroyed; they often create refugee problems and atrocities; (5) zero‐sum in nature—the parties involved perceive any loss suffered by the other side as their gain and vice versa; (6) total—they are perceived as being about needs or values that are absolutely essential for the parties' existence and/or survival; (7) central—members of a society involved in such conflicts are preoccupied constantly and continuously with it; this centrality is reflected by the fact that the conflict preoccupies the cognitive repertoire of individuals, as well as by its saliency on the public agenda.5 As is shown in later chapters, all three regions examined in this study experienced such consequences from the intractable/protracted conflicts in which they were engaged.

The Role of Peace/Conflict‐Resolution Organizations in Ending Violent Conflicts

The need for effective conflict‐resolution strategies has increased since the end of the cold war with the emergence of numerous regional and subregional conflicts around the world. Scholars expect that the number of conflicts will increase along with rapid population growth, expanding environmental degradation, increasing income discrepancies between countries, immigration and migration processes, and the proliferation of conventional, nuclear, and chemical weapons.6

(p.8) The transition from violent conflict to negotiation and the creation of a new type of relationship are complex and occur on several levels and in different phases. First, the political leadership must decide to pursue an alternative path to the existing violent one. Such a decision is rarely made without the support of important political constituencies, which often express themselves through public opinion favoring a resolution of the conflict. This support does not happen instantly but usually comes after the issue has been brought up, fought for, and deliberated in various forums, including NGOs dedicated to the cause of peace and conflict resolution. After the political decision to “change course” has been made and implemented, actual arrangements have to be created to accommodate the changes resulting from the new reality. For example, after the decision was made in 1994 to hold democratic elections in South Africa, the population needed to be prepared to vote since it never had participated in such elections. This also was true for the referendum in Northern Ireland that followed the Good Friday Agreement (1998) and the elections for the Palestinian legislature (1995)—mechanisms unknown to the populations involved. It also is the case for other institutions that are now being created. Finally, a peace agreement can endure only if a new type of relationship is developed between the conflicting parties and new social and economic institutions—based on values that reflect the new reality—are created.

Galtung uses the concepts of “peace‐building,” “peace‐making,” and “peace‐keeping” to depict these different phases and levels.7 In pursuing peace—which includes all of these elements—institutions in the public sector, headed by the official leadership of the country, typically play certain roles; the business sector can and often does play other roles; and organizations belonging to the nongovernmental/nonprofit/third sectors play yet other roles. This division of labor is based on the sectors' differential characteristics and mandates, yet it is important to stress that all three types of organizations can be involved in all three phases or levels of the conflict‐ resolution process. Thus, for example, while peace‐making usually is considered to be within the public sector domain, both the business and the third sectors can have a role in pressuring the official leadership to make the appropriate political decisions. A case in point is the resolution of the conflict in South Africa, where economic boycotts of the country in the 1980s led the business community to withdraw its support from the political leadership advocating apartheid and in turn to support de Klerk's policy of ending the racist regime. Furthermore, the Institute for a Democratic Alternative for South Africa (Idasa), a nonprofit organization, initiated and organized the 1987 Dakar meeting that brought together for the first time leading “white” intellectuals and politicians (mainly Afrikaner), and key ANC officials.

Scholars and policymakers increasingly recognize the importance of the third sector, especially in peace‐building and peace‐keeping. The Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict states: (p.9)

Three broad categories of NGOs offer especially important potential contributions to the prevention of deadly conflict: human rights and other advocacy groups; humanitarian and development organizations; and the small but growing number of “Track Two” groups that help open the way to more formal internal or international peace processes. Human rights, Track Two, and grassroots development organizations all provide early warning of rising local tension and help open or protect the necessary political space between groups and the government that can allow local leaders to settle differences peacefully. . . . Some NGOs have an explicit focus on conflict prevention and resolution. They may: monitor conflicts and provide early warning and insight into a particular conflict; convene the adversarial parties (providing a neutral forum); pave the way for mediation and undertake mediation; carry out education and training for conflict resolution, building an indigenous capacity for coping with ongoing conflicts; help to strengthen institutions for conflict resolution; foster development of the rule of law; help to establish a free press with responsible reporting on conflict; assist in planning and implementing elections; and provide technical assistance on democratic arrangements that reduce the likelihood of violence in divided societies.8

Similarly, there is a growing body of research—mostly from a social‐ movement perspective—on these types of organizations, especially regarding how they arise, organize, and the strategies they use to promote peace and institutionalize democratic institutions.9 More generally, Seymour Lipset has argued that NGOs, which constitute civil society, are fundamental to a stable democracy.10 As he puts it, “Organizations stimulate interests and activities in the larger polity; they can be consulted by political institutions about projects that affect them and their members, and they can transfer this information to the citizenry. Civil organizations reduce resistance to unanticipated changes because they prevent the isolation of political institutions from the polity and can smooth over, or at least recognize, interest differences early on.”11 As we shall see, the P/CROs in this study did indeed fulfill such a role.

In all three regions, third‐sector organizations did not become involved in the promotion of peace during the 1980s or even during the preceding decade; rather, they had a history that in some cases dated back to the 1920s. For example, the South African Institute of Race Relations (SAIRR) was founded in 1929 and Black Sash in 1955. In Israel, the first peace organization—the Peace Covenant (Brit Shalom)—was founded in Jerusalem in the mid‐1920s. Only in Northern Ireland and Palestine did peace organizations specifically dedicated to bridging the two communities emerge primarily during the 1970s. Furthermore, individuals and organizations dedicated to peace in other parts of the world and around different conflicts (e.g., Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr.) served as examples for and inspired many of these organizations.

In all three regions, the initial efforts to mobilize for peace and conflict resolution had humble beginnings, usually precipitated by a critical political (p.10) event. In Israel, the Movement for Peace and Security was organized shortly after the 1967 War to warn about the threat the occupation posed to Israeli democratic institutions, a theme that later peace organizations utilized. A similar organization, Strength and Peace (Oz Ve'Shalom), offered a religious rationale for the need for peace. In Palestine, several peace organizations, such as the Alternative Information Center, rose in tandem with the Israeli peace movement. In Northern Ireland, the outbreak of violence in the late 1960s served as an impetus for the rise of such organizations as the Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association and the Peace People. Likewise, in South Africa, the increasing repression of the apartheid regime provided the impetus for the formation of peace organizations: Black Sash was formed in reaction to the 1956 Senate Act, and the End Conscription Campaign emerged in response to the increasing use of the military to repress dissent.

These initial and very modest attempts at changing the reality and course of the conflict through mobilization for peace were carried out by a very small number of individuals and groups in all three regions; their work was sporadic and isolated so that few people were even aware of or affected by it. This reality changed during the 1980s and 1990s. First, as has been mentioned previously, there was a multitude of groups and organizations—reflecting a variety of ideologies and strategies—that advocated an end to the violent conflicts. Second, at times (mostly during demonstrations) some of these organizations were able to mobilize tens and even hundreds of thousands of supporters, receiving ample media coverage. Third, some of them were able to attract significant funds to carry out their mission. Indeed, as noted in subsequent chapters, many of the key organizations became professionalized, developing permanent and stable organizational features to accomplish their work. Moreover, over time an identifiable network of peace/conflict‐resolution organizations emerged in each region. In this book we focus on these networks and the key organizations within them.

Peace and Conflict‐Resolution Organizations and Civil Society

The development of a network of peace and conflict‐resolution organizations must be viewed in the broader growth of the development and expansion of civil society in the three regions. Indeed, it is fair to say that the maturation of civil society was a prerequisite for the institutionalization of the peace and conflict‐resolution organizations. One of the important characteristics of democratic societies is the existence of organizations that are neither public (created by law or official regulation) nor commercial (with a profit orientation). These organizations, which have different names in different countries (i.e., voluntary organizations, NGOs, nonprofit organizations) reflect a fundamental (p.11) freedom in democratic societies—the freedom of association. The number and roles of these organizations vary in different countries, but for the last two decades their numbers have increased dramatically in practically all countries of the world. Furthermore, they have become active in new fields of activity and thus have taken on new roles and responsibilities; hence their importance has increased significantly, as well.

The expansion of civil society, or the third sector, and its constituent organizations has spawned considerable research both within and between countries. The comparative perspective has been particularly instrumental in identifying and understanding the common features of civil society across countries.12 Most important, it also has shown how societal factors—such as the role of the central government, the attributes of the legal system, and the class structure—influence the formation, size, and characteristics of civil society. Still, most of the research on civil society has focused on service organizations in such fields as health, culture and education, and the environment. Organizations dedicated to the resolution of intractable societal conflicts have received less attention. By undertaking a comparative study of peace and conflict‐resolution organizations, we aim to broaden the intellectual boundaries of the field, both by studying this particular set of organizations, which typically has not been included in studies of civil society, and by doing so from a comparative perspective.

Although “peace and conflict‐resolution organizations” is admittedly a social construct (as are other third‐sector categories), it is important to recognize that the term signifies actual organizations that have expended considerable resources—human, fiscal, social, and political—to advance the cause of peace. In all three regions, many of the organizations we categorized as P/CROs did in fact view themselves as part of the peace “camp” or “net‐ work”; there were directories that listed them, and often they coordinated activities around issues of mutual concern. This does not imply that these organizations had only cooperative interrelationships; in fact, as we show, some of them were in stiff competition with each other. While the category of P/CRO was essential to the organization of this study, we believe that it also has important theoretical and empirical implications beyond the actual organizations we studied. The category stands for an important class of voluntary associations that are committed to addressing and resolving intractable social conflicts, whether ethnic, religious, geographic, or class. As noted in our study, we believe that this class of organizations shares some common characteristics. Moreover, an analytic model can be developed to explain their development, goals, structure, and strategies across societies, as we have done in our own study. Therefore, this category of organizations merits closer attention as an essential feature of civil society.

An international comparative study always presents difficult methodological problems for the researcher. The ways in which we dealt with these are (p.12) outlined in the next chapter. However, a comparative study of third‐sector organizations engaged in the peace and conflict‐resolution work differs from studies of other organizations that deal with mental retardation or cancer, for example. For these latter organizations, the substantive issue around which they are formed—whether they are service provision or advocacy organizations—has a clear and accepted definition.

This is not the case for peace and conflict‐resolution organizations because “peace” is differentially defined in different conflicts and sometimes by those on differing sides of the conflict, as well. The history and nature of the specific conflicts created different definitions of “peace” in the three regions we studied. Thus, for example, in South Africa, where a racial regime was in power, the goal of the organizations was not only to end the violence but also to achieve peace with justice or end the apartheid regime. These organizations differed from the ANC guerillas, who fought for the same end but used violence as a tactic. In Israel/Palestine, where two peoples claimed the same piece of land, but where one occupied the land leaving the other without any political rights, the P/CROs' goal was to create a situation of mutual recognition that could lead to practical peaceful solutions. In Northern Ireland, where two ethnic/religious groups claimed that the same piece of land belonged to different sovereign states, the P/CROs aimed to find a creative solution that would enable the two communities to end the violence and coexist and the society as a whole to develop.

In studying this complex phenomenon, it soon became clear that certain characteristics of the P/CROs would be lost if we maintained only an international comparative focus. On the other hand, using a comparative approach enabled us to focus on certain distinct dimensions of the phenomenon, which elicited some surprising and important findings. Therefore, we decided to structure the study around a dual focus: local in‐depth analysis of the P/CROs and an international comparison of the P/CROs across regions (see chapter 2).

Structure of This Book

This book consists of five parts. Part I includes two chapters that provide an introduction to the International Study of Peace/Conflict‐Resolution Organizations, review existing literature, and outline the study's conceptual and methodological framework. Part II comprises one chapter that discusses the histories of the three conflicts and suggests some similarities and differences among them. Part III has four chapters that summarize the data from the individual team studies in South Africa, Northern Ireland, Israel, and Palestine. Part IV contains two chapters that present a comparative analysis. The book concludes with an appraisal of the study.

(p.13) Notes

(1.) H. Miall, The Peacemakers (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), p. 9.

(2.) Ibid.; T. Saaty and J. Alexander, Conflict Resolution (New York: Praeger, 1989); A. Oberschall, “Theories of Social Conflict,” Annual Review of Sociology 4 (1978): 291–315.

(3.) H. Bash, “Social Movements and Social Problems: Toward a Conceptual Rapprochement,” Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change 17 (1994): 247–284; R. Pong, “Social Problems as a Conflict Process,” Perspectives on Social Problems 1 (1989): 59–76.

(4.) C. Grosser and J. Mondros, “Pluralism and Participation: The Political Action Approach,” in Theory and Practice of Community Social Work, ed. S. Taylor and R. Roberts (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), pp. 154–178; L. Schaller, “Conflict over Conflict,” in Strategies of Community Organization: A Book of Readings, ed. F. Cox, J. Erlich, J. Rothman, and J. Tropman (Itasca, Ill.: Peacock Publishers, 1970), pp. 171–198.

(5.) D. Bar‐Tal, “Societal Beliefs in Times of Intractable Conflict: The Israeli Case,” International Journal of Conflict Management 9 (1998): 22–50.

(6.) Miall, The Peacemakers.

(7.) Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means (London: Sage, 1996).

(8.) Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflicts: Final Report (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997).

(9.) Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly, eds., How Social Movements Matter (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

(10.) Seymour Martin Lipset, “The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited,” American Sociological Review 59 (February 1994): 1–22.

(11.) Ibid., pp. 12–13.

(12.) L. Salamon and H. K. Anheier, Defining the Non‐Profit Sector: A Cross‐ National Analysis (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997).

Notes:

(1.) H. Miall, The Peacemakers (New York: St. Martin's, 1992), p. 9.

(2.) Ibid.; T. Saaty and J. Alexander, Conflict Resolution (New York: Praeger, 1989); A. Oberschall, “Theories of Social Conflict,” Annual Review of Sociology 4 (1978): 291–315.

(3.) H. Bash, “Social Movements and Social Problems: Toward a Conceptual Rapprochement,” Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change 17 (1994): 247–284; R. Pong, “Social Problems as a Conflict Process,” Perspectives on Social Problems 1 (1989): 59–76.

(4.) C. Grosser and J. Mondros, “Pluralism and Participation: The Political Action Approach,” in Theory and Practice of Community Social Work, ed. S. Taylor and R. Roberts (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), pp. 154–178; L. Schaller, “Conflict over Conflict,” in Strategies of Community Organization: A Book of Readings, ed. F. Cox, J. Erlich, J. Rothman, and J. Tropman (Itasca, Ill.: Peacock Publishers, 1970), pp. 171–198.

(5.) D. Bar‐Tal, “Societal Beliefs in Times of Intractable Conflict: The Israeli Case,” International Journal of Conflict Management 9 (1998): 22–50.

(6.) Miall, The Peacemakers.

(7.) Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means (London: Sage, 1996).

(8.) Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, Preventing Deadly Conflicts: Final Report (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997).

(9.) Marco Giugni, Doug McAdam, and Charles Tilly, eds., How Social Movements Matter (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

(10.) Seymour Martin Lipset, “The Social Requisites of Democracy Revisited,” American Sociological Review 59 (February 1994): 1–22.

(11.) Ibid., pp. 12–13.

(12.) L. Salamon and H. K. Anheier, Defining the Non‐Profit Sector: A Cross‐ National Analysis (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1997).