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Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification$
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Robert J. Fogelin

Print publication date: 1994

Print ISBN-13: 9780195089875

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0195089871.001.0001

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Externalism

Externalism

Chapter:
(p.41) 3 Externalism
Source:
Pyrrhonian Reflections on Knowledge and Justification
Author(s):

Robert J. Fogelin (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0195089871.003.0004

Externalist analyses of knowledge are motivated, at least in part, by the fact that in Gettier examples, S, the person who claims to know p, is right in believing that p, but only as a matter of luck. The most natural way of ruling out these lucky hits on the truth is to demand that S's belief must stand in the right sort of causal relationship to the fact believed. The chapter examines an early version of this approach offered by Goldman. It also examines BonJour's objections to any purely causal (or reliabilist) account of knowledge.

Keywords:   BonJour, externalism, Gettier problems, Goldman, reliabilism

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