Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Philosophical Interpretations$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Robert J. Fogelin

Print publication date: 1992

Print ISBN-13: 9780195071627

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/019507162X.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (www.oxfordscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2019. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use (for details see www.oxfordscholarship.com/page/privacy-policy).date: 20 March 2019

Hume's Worries About Personal Identity

Hume's Worries About Personal Identity

(p.81) 5 Hume's Worries About Personal Identity
Philosophical Interpretations

Robert J. Fogelin (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

In the Appendix to his Treatise of Human Nature, Hume expressed his dissatisfaction with his treatment of the topic of personal identity. Unfortunately, he was not altogether forthcoming about what was bothering him, and, as a result, a variety of interpretations have been put forward on this matter. The suggestion presented in this chapter is that Hume's difficulties about personal identity are grounded in a rejection of the notion of a substantial soul or self in which ideas could inhere. Moreover, Hume also thinks that ideas themselves count as substances and thus neither need to nor can adhere in something else. Given this degree of separateness and looseness, it seems impossible to give any account of how the notion of personal identity could arise.

Keywords:   Hume, personal identity, self, soul, substance, Treatise of Human Nature

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .