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Philosophical Papers$
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J. L. Austin, J. O. Urmson, and G. J. Warnock

Print publication date: 1979

Print ISBN-13: 9780192830210

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/019283021X.001.0001

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Truth 1

Truth 1

Chapter:
(p.117) 5 Truth1
Source:
Philosophical Papers
Author(s):

J. L. Austin

J. O. Urmson

G. J. Warnock

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/019283021X.003.0005

Deals with the question of whether there is a use of ‘is true’ that is the primary or generic name for that which at bottom we are always saying ‘is true’. Austin discusses the views that truth is primarily a property of beliefs and of true statements. He goes on to argue that the word ‘true’ denotes the validity of an intended (or expected) correspondence between a representation and what it represents, and dismantles confusions about the meaning of the words that underlie such a view, such as ‘fact that’ and ‘corresponds’.

Keywords:   Austin, belief, correspondence, fact, meaning, property, representation, statement, truth

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