Philosophy of Science : oso

Teleology, First Principles, and Scientific Method in Aristotle's Biology

Allan Gotthelf — 2013-01-24

Author:: Allan Gotthelf
ISBN:: 9780199287956
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287956.001.0001
Published in print:: 2012
Published Online:: 2013-01-24

This book — an interconnected set of sixteen chapters, four previously unpublished, addresses in parallel three main topics and Aristotle's three main biological treatises. Starting with a set of six studies of central aspects of Aristotle's natural teleology, including its basis in what the book calls ‘irreducible potentials for form’, the book proceeds to the axiomatic (and other explanatory) structure of biological explanation to be found in the Parts of Animals, identifying three sorts of first principles involved in that structure. An exploration, in Part III, of the implications of these two treatises for our understanding of Aristotle's metaphysics (including the teleological basis of his theory of substance and essence), is followed in Part IV by a study of the method by which Aristotle, in the History of Animals, organizes the data that makes possible such systematic, explanatory study of animals; this study offers a new view of the place of classification in that enterprise. The concluding part, on ‘Aristotle as Theoretical Biologist’, first explores the basis of Charles Darwin's great 1882 praise of Aristotle, and then, in the first printing of a general lecture long delivered worldwide, provides an overview of Aristotle's practice as a philosophically oriented biologist, and ‘a proper verdict’ on his greatness as a scientist.

Mind and Cosmos

Thomas Nagel — 2013-01-24

Author:: Thomas Nagel
ISBN:: 9780199919758
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, General, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199919758.001.0001
Published in print:: 2012
Published Online:: 2013-01-24

This book argues that the widely accepted world view of materialist naturalism is untenable. The mind-body problem cannot be confined to the relation between animal minds and animal bodies. If materialism cannot accommodate consciousness and other mind-related aspects of reality, then we must abandon a purely materialist understanding of nature in general, extending to biology, evolutionary theory, and cosmology. Since minds are features of biological systems that have developed through evolution, the standard materialist version of evolutionary biology is fundamentally incomplete. And the cosmological history that led to the origin of life and the coming into existence of the conditions for evolution cannot be a merely materialist history. An adequate conception of nature would have to explain the appearance in the universe of materially irreducible conscious minds, as such. No such explanation is available, and the physical sciences, including molecular biology, cannot be expected to provide one. The book explores these problems through a general treatment of the obstacles to reductionism, with more specific application to the phenomena of consciousness, cognition, and value. The conclusion is that physics cannot be the theory of everything.

From Zeno to Arbitrage

Brian Skyrms — 2013-01-24

Author:: Brian Skyrms
ISBN:: 9780199652808
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics/Epistemology
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199652808.001.0001
Published in print:: 2012
Published Online:: 2013-01-24

The essays in the book center on the concept of probability. What is the framework within which probability comfortably lives? What are the coherence principles that must be satisfied for degrees of belief to be probabilities, and how do these principles generalize to probability change? What is the relation between coherent degrees of belief, beliefs about chances, and inductive inference? What constraints does coherence put on inductive skepticism?

The Artful Species

Stephen Davies — 2013-01-24

Author:: Stephen Davies
ISBN:: 9780199658541
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Aesthetics, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199658541.001.0001
Published in print:: 2012
Published Online:: 2013-01-24

This book explores the idea that our aesthetic responses and art behaviors are connected to our evolved human nature. Our humanoid forerunners displayed aesthetic sensibilities hundreds of thousands of years ago and the art standing of prehistoric cave paintings is virtually uncontested. After introducing the topic, Part I analyzes the key concepts of the aesthetic, art, evolution, and how they might be related. Among other issues, there is consideration of whether animals have aesthetic tastes and whether art is not only universal but cross-culturally comprehensible. Part II is on aesthetics. The many aesthetic interests that humans take in animals and how these reflect our biological interests are examined, as is the idea that our environmental and landscape preferences are rooted in the experiences of our distant ancestors. In considering the controversial subject of human beauty, evolutionary psychologists focus on female physical attractiveness in the context of mate selection, but here a broader view decouples human beauty from mate choice and explains why it goes more with social performance and self-presentation. Part III asks if the arts, together or singly, are biological adaptations, incidental by-products of nonart adaptations, or so removed from biology that they rate as purely cultural technologies. None of the many positions examined is conclusively supported, but there are grounds, nevertheless, for seeing art as part of human nature. It serves as a powerful and complex signal of human fitness, and so cannot be incidental to biology. Indeed, such behaviors are the touchstones of our humanity.

Scepticism and Reliable Belief

José L. Zalabardo — 2012-09-20

Author:: José L. Zalabardo
ISBN:: 9780199656073
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199656073.001.0001
Published in print:: 2012
Published Online:: 2012-09-20

Reliabilist accounts of knowledge are widely seen as having the resources for blocking sceptical arguments, since these arguments appear to rely on assumptions about the nature of knowledge that are rendered illegitimate by reliabilist accounts. The goal of this book is to assess the main arguments against the possibility of knowledge, and its conclusions challenge this consensus. The book articulates and defends a theory of knowledge that belongs firmly in the truth-tracking tradition, and argues that although the theory has the resources for blocking the main standard lines of sceptical reasoning, there is a sceptical argument against which the theory offers no defence, as it doesn’t rely on any assumptions that the theory would render illegitimate. The book ends with the suggestion that the problem might have a metaphysical solution—that although the sceptical argument may make no illegitimate epistemological assumptions, it does rest on a questionable account of the nature of cognition.

The Laws of Belief

Wolfgang Spohn — 2012-09-20

Author:: Wolfgang Spohn
ISBN:: 9780199697502
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199697502.001.0001
Published in print:: 2012
Published Online:: 2012-09-20

Ranking theory will be claimed to deliver the first full account of the dynamics of belief and to be the legitimate sister of probability theory. This entails its deep significance for fundamental issues in epistemology and the philosophy of science. Therefore this book motivates and introduces the basic notion of a ranking function, which provides a new kind of degrees ob belief that at same time accounts for belief simpliciter. It develops ranking theory in ample detail, up to algorithms of inductive reasoning. It provides a measurement theory for ranking functions. It accounts for auto-epistemology in ranking-theoretic terms. It explicates the basic notion of a (deductive or non-deductive) reason, which is the entry to its rich philosophical applications. Among these are: a new account of lawlikeness, an account of ceteris paribus laws, a new perspective on dispositions, a rich and detailed theory of deterministic causation, an understanding of natural modalities as an objectification of epistemic modalities, an account of the experiential basis of belief, and thus a restructuring of the debate on foundationalism and coherentism (and externalism and contextualism), and finally a revival of fundamental a priori principles of reason fathoming the basics of empiricism and the relation between reason and truth and concluding in a proof of a weak principle of causality. All this is accompanied by thorough-going comparative discussions, on a general level as well as within each topic, and in particular with respect to probability theory that proves to be the major guideline of this book.

The Emergent Multiverse

David Wallace — 2012-09-20

Author:: David Wallace
ISBN:: 9780199546961
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics/Epistemology
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199546961.001.0001
Published in print:: 2012
Published Online:: 2012-09-20

This book defends the view that the Everett interpretation of quantum theory, often called the ‘many worlds theory’, is not some new physical theory or some metaphysical addition to quantum theory, but simply quantum theory itself understood in a straightforwardly literal way. As such ‐ despite its radical implications for the nature of our universe ‐ the Everett interpretation is actually the conservative way to approach quantum theory, requiring revisions neither to our best theories of physics, nor to conventional philosophy of science. The book is in three parts. Part I explains how quantum theory implies the existence of an emergent branching structure in physical reality, and explores the conceptual and technical details of decoherence theory, the theory which allows us to quantify that branching. Part II is concerned with the problem of probability, and makes the case that probability, far from being the key difficulty for the Everett interpretation, actually makes more sense from a many‐worlds viewpoint. Part III explores the implications of an Everettian perspective on a variety of topics in physics and philosophy.

Creation Ethics

David DeGrazia — 2012-09-20

Author:: David DeGrazia
ISBN:: 9780195389630
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195389630.001.0001
Published in print:: 2012
Published Online:: 2012-09-20

The ethics of creating—or declining to create—people has been addressed in several contexts: debates over abortion and embryo research; literature on “self-creation”; discussions of procreative rights and responsibilities, genetic engineering, and future generations. Here, for the first time, is a sustained, scholarly analysis of all of these issues—a discussion combining breadth of topics with philosophical depth, imagination with current scientific understanding, argumentative rigor with accessibility. The overarching aim of this book is to illuminate a broad array of issues connected with reproduction and genetics, through the lens of moral philosophy. With novel frameworks for understanding prenatal moral status and human identity, and exceptional fairness to those holding different views, the author sheds new light on the ethics of abortion and embryo research, genetic enhancement and prenatal genetic interventions, procreation and parenting, as well as decisions that affect the quality of life of future generations. Along the way, he helpfully introduces personal identity theory and value theory as well as such complex topics as moral status, wrongful life, and the “nonidentity problem.” The results include a subjective account of human well-being, a standard for responsible procreation and parenting, and a theoretical bridge between consequentialist and nonconsequentialist ethical theories. The upshot is a synoptic, mostly liberal vision of the ethics of creating human beings.

Space, Time, and Stuff

Frank Arntzenius — 2012-05-24

Author:: Frank Arntzenius
ISBN:: 9780199696604
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696604.001.0001
Published in print:: 2012
Published Online:: 2012-05-24

Much of this book can be seen as an attempt to show that physics is geometry, an attempt to show that the fundamental structure of the physical world is purely geometrical structure. Along the way, some non-standard views about the structure of spacetime and its inhabitants are examined, such as the idea that space and time, literally, are pointless, the idea that quantum mechanics is a completely local and separable theory, the idea that antiparticles are just particles travelling back in time, and the idea that time has no structure whatsoever. The main thrust of the book is that there are good reasons to believe that spaces other than spacetime exist, and that it is the existence of these additional spaces that allows one to reduce all of physics to geometry. Philosophy, metaphysics in particular, plays an important role in this book: the assumption that the fundamental laws of physics are simple in terms of the fundamental physical properties and relations is pivotal. Without this assumption one gets nowhere. That is to say, when trying to extract the fundamental structure of the world from theories of physics one ignores philosophy at one’s peril!

Processes of Life

John Dupré — 2012-05-24

Author:: John Dupré
ISBN:: 9780199691982
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691982.001.0001
Published in print:: 2012
Published Online:: 2012-05-24

This volume collects essays written by John Dupré during his time as Director of the ESRC centre for Genomics in Society, and reflects his interest in the implications of emerging ideas in biology for philosophy. Particular interests include: epigenetics and related areas of molecular biology that have eroded the exceptional status of the gene, and presented the genome as fully interactive with the rest of the cell; developmental systems theory which, especially in the light of epigenetics, provides a space for a vision of evolution that takes full account of the fundamental importance of developmental processes; and microbiology, the elephant in the room of contemporary philosophy of biology. The emphasis on the importance of microbes is perhaps the most distinctive theme of the essays, and one that is shown to subvert such basic biological assumptions as the organization of biological kinds on a branching Tree of Life, and the simple traditional conception of the biological organism. These topics are understood in the context of a view of science, partly taken from earlier work, but developed further in some of the present essays, as realistically grounded in the natural order, but at the same time pluralistic and inextricably integrated within a social and normative context. Topics to which these philosophical and scientific ideas are addressed include the nature of the organism, the limits of neo-Darwinian evolutionary theory, the significance of genomics, the biological status of human races, and the evolutionary and developmental plasticity of human nature.

Mathematics and Scientific Representation

Christopher Pincock — 2012-05-24

Author:: Christopher Pincock
ISBN:: 9780199757107
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199757107.001.0001
Published in print:: 2012
Published Online:: 2012-05-24

Mathematics plays a central role in much of contemporary science, but philosophers have struggled to understand what this role is or how significant it might be for mathematics and science. In this book Pincock tackles this perennial question in a new way by asking how mathematics contributes to the success of our best scientific representations. In the first part of the book this question is posed and sharpened using a proposal for how we can determine the content of a scientific representation. Several different sorts of contributions from mathematics are then articulated. Pincock argues that each contribution can be understood as broadly epistemic, so that what mathematics ultimately contributes to science is best connected with our scientific knowledge. In the second part of the book alternative approaches to the role of mathematics in science are critically evaluated. These include the potential benefits for scientific discovery and scientific explanation. A major focus of this part of the book is the indispensability argument for mathematical platonism. Using the results of part one, Pincock argues that this argument can at best support a weak form of realism about the truth-value of the statements of mathematics. The book concludes with a chapter on pure mathematics and the remaining options for making sense of its interpretation and epistemology. Thoroughly grounded in case studies drawn from scientific practice, this book aims to bring together current debates in both the philosophy of mathematics and the philosophy of science and to demonstrate the philosophical importance of applications of mathematics.

The Limits of the Self

Thomas Pradeu and Elizabeth Vitanza — 2012-05-24

Author:: Thomas Pradeu, Elizabeth Vitanza
ISBN:: 9780199775286
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics/Epistemology
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199775286.001.0001
Published in print:: 2012
Published Online:: 2012-05-24

What counts as an individual in the living world? What does it mean for a living thing to remain the same through time while constantly changing? Immunology, one of the most dynamic fields of today’s biology, considers these questions its province, and answers them through its crucial concepts of “self” and “nonself.” Though immunology has been dominated since the 1940s by the self-nonself theory, this book argues that this theory is inadequate, because immune responses to self constituents and immune tolerance of foreign entities are the rule, not the exception. An alternative theory, the continuity theory, is advanced instead. This theory offers a new way to answer the question of what triggers an immune response. It also echoes the recent realization that all organisms, and not higher vertebrates only, have an immune system. This book’s main thesis is that the self-nonself theory should be abandoned, but that immunology still proves to be decisive for delineating the boundaries of the organism. Articulating an evolutionary and an immunological perspective, it offers an original conception of the organism. Tolerance of the fetus by the mother and of countless bacteria on the body’s surfaces proves that every organism is heterogeneous, that is, made of entities of different origins. In other words, every organism appears as a chimera, a mixed living thing the cohesiveness of which is ensured by the constant action of its immune system. The Limits of the Self will be essential reading for anyone interested in the definition of biological individuality and the understanding of the immune system.

Isaac Newton's Scientific Method

William L. Harper — 2012-05-24

Author:: William L. Harper
ISBN:: 9780199570409
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570409.001.0001
Published in print:: 2011
Published Online:: 2012-05-24

This book examines Newton’s argument for universal gravity and his application of it to resolve the problem of deciding between geocentric and heliocentric world systems by measuring masses of the sun and planets. Newton’s inferences from phenomena realize an ideal of empirical success that is richer than prediction. To achieve this rich sort of empirical success a theory needs, not only to accurately predict the phenomena it purports to explain, but also, to have those phenomena accurately measure the parameters which explain them. Newton’s method aims to turn theoretical questions into ones which can be empirically answered by measurement from phenomena. Newton employs theory-mediated measurements to turn data into far more informative evidence than can be achieved by confirmation from prediction alone. Propositions inferred from phenomena are provisionally accepted as guides to further research. This methodology, guided by its rich ideal of empirical success, supports a conception of scientific progress that does not require construing it as progress toward Laplace’s ideal limit of a final theory of everything and is not threatened by the classic argument against convergent realism. Newton’s method endorses the radical theoretical transformation from his theory to Einstein’s. It is strikingly realized in the development and application of testing frameworks for relativistic theories of gravity. In addition, it is very much at work in cosmology today.

The Quantum Mechanics of Minds and Worlds

Jeffrey A. Barrett — 2012-03-22

Author:: Jeffrey A. Barrett
ISBN:: 9780199247431
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics/Epistemology
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199247431.001.0001
Published in print:: 2001
Published Online:: 2012-03-22

This book presents the most comprehensive study yet of a problem that has puzzled physicists and philosophers since the 1930s. The standard theory of quantum mechanics is in one sense the most successful physical theory ever, predicting the behaviour of the basic constituents of all physical things; no other theory has ever made such accurate empirical predictions. However, if one tries to understand the theory as providing a complete and accurate framework for the description of the behaviour of all physical interactions, it becomes evident that the theory is ambiguous, or even logically inconsistent. The most notable attempt to formulate the theory so as to deal with this problem, the quantum measurement problem, was initiated by Hugh Everett III in the 1950s. This book gives a careful and challenging examination and evaluation of the work of Everett and those who have followed him. The informal approach, minimizing technicality, makes the book accessible and illuminating for philosophers and physicists alike.

Tropes

Douglas Ehring — 2012-01-19

Author:: Douglas Ehring
ISBN:: 9780199608539
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199608539.001.0001
Published in print:: 2011
Published Online:: 2012-01-19

The main goal of this work is to provide a metaphysical account of properties and of how they are related to concrete particulars. On the broadest level, this work is a defense of tropes and of trope bundle theory as the best accounts of properties and objects, respectively, and, second, a defense of a specific brand of trope nominalism, Natural Class Trope Nominalism. Each of these tasks is pursued separately, with the first Part of this work acting as a general introduction and defense of tropes and trope bundle theory, and the second Part acting as the more specific defense of Natural Class Trope Nominalism. In Part 1 it is argued that there are tropes. Part 1 also provides an outline of what tropes can do for us metaphysically, while remaining neutral between different theories of tropes. Included in Part 1 are an account of the universal–particular distinction, an argument for the existence of tropes based on the phenomenon of moving properties, the development of a trope bundle theory of objects and a trope-based solution to the problems of mental causations. The second Part presents a fuller picture of what a trope is by way of Natural Class Trope Nominalism, according to which a trope's nature is determined by membership in natural classes of tropes. In addition, in Part 2 a defense is developed of Natural Class Trope Nominalism against what have been thought to be fatal objections to this view, a defense grounded in property counterpart theory without modal realism.

Getting Causes from Powers

Stephen Mumford and Rani Lill Anjum — 2012-01-19

Author:: Stephen Mumford, Rani Lill Anjum
ISBN:: 9780199695614
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199695614.001.0001
Published in print:: 2011
Published Online:: 2012-01-19

This book develops the theory of causal dispositionalism. Others have already suggested that a theory of causation would follow from an ontology of real dispositions or powers. This book attempts to show how. The book argues that powers come together in complex partnerships producing something together that they could not have produced alone. They will do so in a distinctly dispositional way that is not reducible to necessity. The mode of composition of causes can vary and is sometimes non-linear. The book calls this view compositional pluralism. The book argues for the simultaneity of cause and effect as causation is the process that occurs when partnered powers produce their effect. It begins once those partners are together and ends either when the process is complete or is interrupted. The theory explains how causal claims are distinguished from others and why there is no causation by absence. The book distinguishes the distinct, sui generis dispositional modality of causation and show how it can be known directly through experience. The book applies the theory to the science of biology, where it is corroborated.

Creating Consilience

Edward Slingerland and Mark Collard — 2012-01-19

Author:: EdwardSlingerlandUniversity of British ColumbiaMarkCollardSimon Fraser University
ISBN:: 9780199794393
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, General, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199794393.001.0001
Published in print:: 2011
Published Online:: 2012-01-19

Calls for a “consilient” or “vertically integrated” approach to the study of human mind and culture have, for the most part, been received by scholars in the humanities with either indifference or hostility. One reason for this is that consilience has often been framed as bringing the study of humanistic issues into line with the study of nonhuman phenomena, rather than as something to which humanists and scientists contribute equally. The other major reason that consilience has yet to catch on in the humanities is a dearth of compelling examples of the benefits of adopting a consilient approach. This book is the product of a workshop that brought together international scholars from a variety of fields to address both these issues. It includes representative work from workshop speakers and participants that examine how adopting such a consilient stance—informed by cognitive science and grounded in evolutionary theory—would concretely impact specific topics in the humanities, studying each topic in a manner that not only cuts across the humanities-natural science divide, but also across individual humanistic disciplines. By taking seriously the fact that science-humanities integration is a two-way exchange, this volume seeks to facilitate the creation of a new, shared framework for the sciences and humanities.

Basic Structures of Reality

Colin McGinn — 2012-01-19

Author:: Colin McGinn
ISBN:: 9780199841103
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, General
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199841103.001.0001
Published in print:: 2012
Published Online:: 2012-01-19

This book deals with questions of metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of mind from the vantage point of physics. Combining general philosophy with physics, it covers such topics as the definition of matter, the nature of space, motion, gravity, electromagnetic fields, the character of physical knowledge, and consciousness and meaning. Throughout, the book maintains an historical perspective and seeks to determine how much we really know of the world described by physics. It defends a version of “structuralism”: the thesis that our knowledge is partial and merely abstract, leaving a large epistemological gap at the center of physics. The book then connects this element of mystery to parallel mysteries in relation to the mind. Consciousness emerges as just one more mystery of physics. A theory of matter and space is developed, according to which the impenetrability of matter is explained as the deletion of volumes of space. The book proposes a philosophy of science that distinguishes physics from both psychology and biology, explores the ontology of energy, and considers the relevance of physics to seemingly remote fields such as the theory of meaning. In the form of a series of aphorisms, this book presents a metaphysical system that takes laws of nature as fundamental.

Without Good Reason

Edward Stein — 2011-10-03

Author:: Edward Stein
ISBN:: 9780198237730
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198237730.001.0001
Published in print:: 1997
Published Online:: 2011-10-03

Are humans rational? Various experiments performed over the last several decades have been interpreted as showing that humans are irrational: we make significant and consistent errors in logical reasoning, probabilistic reasoning, similarity judgements, and risk assessment, to name a few areas. But can these experiments establish human irrationality, or is it a conceptual truth that humans must be rational, as various philosophers have argued? This book offers a critical account of this debate about rationality in philosophy and cognitive science. It discusses concepts of rationality – the pictures of rationality that the debate centres on – and assesses the empirical evidence used to argue that humans are irrational. The book concludes that the question of human rationality must be answered not conceptually but empirically, using the full resources of an advanced cognitive science. Furthermore, it extends this conclusion to argue that empirical considerations are also relevant to the theory of knowledge; in other words, that epistemology should be naturalized.

Time's Arrow & Archimedes' Point

Huw Price — 2011-10-03

Author:: Huw Price
ISBN:: 9780195117981
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195117981.001.0001
Published in print:: 1997
Published Online:: 2011-10-03

Why is the future so different from the past? Why does the past affect the future and not the other way round? The universe began with the Big Bang — will it end with a “Big Crunch”? This book presents an innovative and controversial view of time and contemporary physics. The book urges physicists, philosophers, and anyone who has ever pondered the paradoxes of time to look at the world from a fresh perspective and he throws fascinating new light on some of the great mysteries of the universe.

Theory and Meaning

David Papineau — 2011-10-03

Author:: David Papineau
ISBN:: 9780198245858
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics/Epistemology
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198245858.001.0001
Published in print:: 1979
Published Online:: 2011-10-03

This book is concerned with those aspects of the theory of meaning for scientific terms that are relevant to questions about the evaluation of scientific theories. The contemporary debate about theory choice in science is normally presented as a conflict between two sets of ideas. On the one hand are notions of objectivity, realism, rationality, and progress in science. On the other is the view that meanings depend on theory, with associated claims about the theory dependence of observation, the theoretical context account of meaning, incommensurability, and so on. The book shows that there is no real contest here; that the two sets of ideas are in fact quite compatible. More specifically, it argues that the meanings of all scientific terms, including those used to report observations, are inseparable from the total context of surrounding theory and so will inevitably vary with theoretical change, but that this is quite consistent with a broadly objectivist account of science. The first half of the book shows how ideas about the theory dependence of observation and meaning have led to the breakdown of the traditional empiricist account of science, and how some of the more obvious responses to these ideas are inadequate. The second half shows how these ideas can satisfactorily be accommodated within a non-relativist account of science.

The Structural Foundations of Quantum Gravity

Dean Rickles, Steven French, and Juha T. Saatsi — 2011-10-03

Author:: DeanRicklesUniversity of Calgary, CanadaStevenFrenchUniversity of Leedshttp://www.philosophy.leeds.ac.uk/Staff/az/Steven_French.htmJuha T.SaatsiUniversity of Manchester
ISBN:: 9780199269693
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199269693.001.0001
Published in print:: 2006
Published Online:: 2011-10-03

Quantum gravity is the name given to a theory that unites general relativity — Einstein's theory of gravitation and spacetime — with quantum field theory, our framework for describing non-gravitational forces. This book brings together philosophers and physicists to discuss a range of conceptual issues that surface in the effort to unite these theories, focusing in particular on the ontological nature of the spacetime that results. Although there has been a great deal written about quantum gravity from the perspective of physicists and mathematicians, very little attention has been paid to the philosophical aspects. This book closes that gap, with chapters written by some of the leading researchers in the field. Individual chapters defend or attack a structuralist perspective on the fundamental ontologies of our physical theories, which offers the possibility of shedding new light on a number of foundational problems.

Simplicity

Elliott Sober — 2011-10-03

Author:: Elliott Sober
ISBN:: 9780198244073
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244073.001.0001
Published in print:: 1975
Published Online:: 2011-10-03

The diversity of our intuitions about simplicity is matched only by the tenacity with which these intuitions refuse to yield to formal characterization. Our intuitions seem unanimous in favour of sparse ontologies, smooth curves, homogeneous universes, invariant equations, and impoverished assumptions. Yet recent theorizing about simplicity presents a veritable chaos of opinion. Here one finds arguments that simplicity is high probability, that it is low probability, and that it is not a probability at all. Indeed, the complexities of the problem of simplicity have led some to question the possibility and the fruitfulness of trying to define the notion of simplicity that seems to be involved in hypothesis choice. This book tries to show that the simplicity of a hypothesis can be measured by attending to how well it answers certain kinds of questions. The more informative a hypothesis is in answering these questions, the simpler it is. The informativeness of hypotheses relative to questions is characterized by the amount of extra information they need to yield answers. The more additional information a hypothesis needs to answer a question, the less informative it is relative to that question.

Science & Reason

Henry E. Kyburg — 2011-10-03

Author:: Henry E. Kyburg
ISBN:: 9780195062533
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195062533.001.0001
Published in print:: 1991
Published Online:: 2011-10-03

This book presents views on a wide range of philosophical problems associated with the study and practice of science and mathematics. The main structure of the book consists of a presentation of notions of epistemic probability and its use in the scientific enterprise i.e., the effort to modify previously adopted beliefs in the light of experience. Intended for cognitive scientists and people in artificial intelligence, as well as for technically oriented philosophers, the book also provides a general overview of the philosophy of science for the non-philosopher.

The Scenes of Inquiry

Nicholas Jardine — 2011-10-03

Author:: Nicholas Jardine
ISBN:: 9780198250395
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198250395.001.0001
Published in print:: 2000
Published Online:: 2011-10-03

This book advocates a radical shift of concern in philosophical, historical, and sociological studies of the sciences — from answers and doctrines to questions and problems — and explores the consequences of such a shift. This book is at once naturalistic and historicist: naturalistic in considering the philosophy of the sciences, in particular as it relates to questions concerning the methods of the sciences and their justifications, to be continuous with the sciences themselves; naturalistic in connecting reality and truth in the sciences with the procedures and outcomes of scientific inquiry; historicist in taking as the basis of sound historical interpretation awareness of past material and social conditions, together with sensitivity to past agents' own modes of interpretation; historicist in holding all questions, categories, and meanings to be historicist constructs; and historicist in taking history to be the primary domain of reflection and criticism for all disciplines.

Regulating Toxic Substances

Carl F. Cranor — 2011-10-03

Author:: Carl F. Cranor
ISBN:: 9780195074369
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195074369.001.0001
Published in print:: 1993
Published Online:: 2011-10-03

This book in the philosophy of law and risk assessment is concerned with the topic of the standards of evidence in legal proceedings and regulatory decisions regarding the toxicity of chemicals. The book argues that the scientific and statistical criteria usually used to determine whether substances are toxic are too rigorous and time-consuming for evidentiary purposes in tort cases and for regulation. The result is the under-regulation of toxic substances and the under-compensation of plaintiffs in tort cases. The book proposes the evidential standards now used should be evaluated with the purposes of the law in mind.

The Probable and The Provable

L. Jonathan Cohen — 2011-10-03

Author:: L. Jonathan Cohen
ISBN:: 9780198244127
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198244127.001.0001
Published in print:: 1977
Published Online:: 2011-10-03

The book was planned and written as a single, sustained argument. But earlier versions of a few parts of it have appeared separately. The object of this book is both to establish the existence of the paradoxes, and also to describe a non-Pascalian concept of probability in terms of which one can analyse the structure of forensic proof without giving rise to such typical signs of theoretical misfit. Neither the complementational principle for negation nor the multiplicative principle for conjunction applies to the central core of any forensic proof in the Anglo-American legal system. There are four parts included in this book. Accordingly, these parts have been written in such a way that they may be read in different orders by different kinds of reader.

Observing Bioethics

Renee C. Fox and Judith P. Swazey — 2011-10-03

Author:: Renee C. Fox, Judith P. Swazey
ISBN:: 9780195365559
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195365559.001.0001
Published in print:: 2008
Published Online:: 2011-10-03

This book examines the history of bioethics as a discipline related not only to modern biology, medicine, and biotechnology but also to the core values and beliefs of American society and its courts, legislatures, and media. The book is written from the perspective of social science. The book draws on first-hand observations and experiences in a variety of American bioethical settings, face-to-face interviews with first- and second-generation figures in the genesis and early unfolding of bioethics, a detailed examination of the theatrical media coverage of what was considered to be a banner event in the annals of bioethics (the creation and birth of the cloned sheep Dolly), case studies of how bioethics has internationally developed, and a large corpus of primary documents and secondary source materials. While recognizing the intellectual, moral, and sociological importance of American bioethics, the book is critical of its characteristics. Foremost among these are what the book identifies as the problems of thinking socially, culturally, and internationally in American bioethics; the “tenuous interdisciplinarity” of the field; and the troubling extent to which the “culture wars” have penetrated bioethics.

Nature and Understanding

Nicholas Rescher — 2011-10-03

Author:: Nicholas Rescher
ISBN:: 9780199261826
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261826.001.0001
Published in print:: 2003
Published Online:: 2011-10-03

Nature and Understanding explores the prospect of looking from a scientific point of view at such central ideas of traditional metaphysics as the simplicity of nature, its comprehensibility, or its systematic integrity. It draws together the philosophy of science, metaphysics and epistemology to study the relationship between what there is and how we can understand it. The author seeks to describe — in a way accessible to philosophers and non-philosophers alike — the metaphysical situation that characterizes the process of inquiry in natural science. His principal aim is to see what light can be shed on reality by examining the modus operandi of natural science itself, focusing as much on its findings as on its conceptual and methodological presuppositions.

A Model of the Universe

Storrs McCall — 2011-10-03

Author:: Storrs McCall
ISBN:: 9780198236221
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236221.001.0001
Published in print:: 1996
Published Online:: 2011-10-03

This book presents a philosophical theory of the nature of the universe based on a new model of its space-time structure. The book shows how his model illuminates a broad range of subjects, including causation, probability, quantum mechanics, identity, and free will, and argues that the fact that the model throws light on such a large number of problems constitutes strong evidence that the universe is as the model portrays it.

The Justification of Science and the Rationality of Religious Belief

Michael C. Banner — 2011-10-03

Author:: Michael C. Banner
ISBN:: 9780198240198
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198240198.001.0001
Published in print:: 1992
Published Online:: 2011-10-03

Believers and non-believers often take it for granted that traditional religious faith is, in principle, incapable of the sort of justification which might be given to a scientific theory. Yet how are scientific theories justified and is it the case that religious belief cannot satisfy the same standards of rationality? Based on a critical examination of recent accounts of the nature of science and of its justification given by Kuhn, Popper, Lakatos, Laudan, and Newton-Smith, this book contends that models of scientific rationality which are used in criticism of religious belief are in fact often inadequate as accounts of the nature of science. It is argued that a realist philosophy of science both reflects the character of science and scientific justification, and also suggests that religious belief could be given a justification of the same sort.

Functions in Mind

Carolyn Price — 2011-10-03

Author:: Carolyn Price
ISBN:: 9780199242009
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199242009.001.0001
Published in print:: 2001
Published Online:: 2011-10-03

This book investigates what it means to say that mental states — thoughts, wishes, perceptual experiences, and so on — are about things in the world. The answer to this deep philosophical problem is a novel teleological account of intentional content, grounded in and shaped by a carefully constructed theory of functions. This book's teleological account centres on the claim that the content of an intentional state depends both on the information that it is supposed to carry and on the way in which it is used — whether to trigger a simple response, to help keep track of an object or place, to help in planning a route through the environment, or in a sophisticated process of reasoning. Along the way the book defends its view from recent objections to teleological theories, and indicates how it might be applied to some notable problems in the philosophy of mind.

An Essay on Belief and Acceptance

L. Jonathan Cohen — 2011-10-03

Author:: L. Jonathan Cohen
ISBN:: 9780198236047
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198236047.001.0001
Published in print:: 1995
Published Online:: 2011-10-03

This study examines the tension between voluntariness and involuntariness in human cognition. The book seeks to counter the widespread tendency for analytic epistemology to be dominated by the concept of belief. Is scientific knowledge properly conceived as being embodied at its best in a passive feeling of belief or in an active policy of acceptance? Should a jury's verdict declare what its members involuntarily accept? And should statements and assertions be presumed to express what their authors believe or what they accept? Does such a distinction between belief and acceptance help to resolve the paradoxes of self-deception and akrasia? Must people be taken to believe everything entailed by what they believe, or merely to accept everything entailed by what they accept? Through a systematic examination of these problems, this book examines issues in contemporary epistemology, philosophy of mind, and cognitive science.

Dispositions

Stephen Mumford — 2011-10-03

Author:: Stephen Mumford
ISBN:: 9780199259823
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199259823.001.0001
Published in print:: 2003
Published Online:: 2011-10-03

This book puts forward a new theory of dispositions, showing how central their role in metaphysics and philosophy of science is. Much of our understanding of the physical and psychological world is expressed in terms of dispositional properties — from the spin of a subatomic particle and the solubility of sugar to a person's belief that zebras have stripes. The book discusses what it means to say that something has a property of this kind, and how dispositions can possibly be real things in the world. They have seemed too many to reside on the fringes of actuality, waiting to manifest themselves; the book's realist account reveals them to be far less enigmatic, and shows that an understanding of dispositions is essential to an understanding of properties, causation, and scientific laws.

Darwin’s Legacy

John Dupré — 2011-10-03

Author:: John Dupré
ISBN:: 9780199284214
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199284214.001.0001
Published in print:: 2005
Published Online:: 2011-10-03

Charles Darwin transformed our understanding of the universe and our place in it with his development of the theory of evolution. One hundred and fifty years later, we are still puzzling over the implications. This book presents an introduction to evolution and what it means for our view of humanity, the natural world, and religion. The author explains the right and the wrong ways to understand evolution: in the latter category fall most of the claims of evolutionary psychology, of which the author gives a withering critique. He shows why the theory of evolution is one of the most important scientific ideas of all time, but makes clear that it cannot explain everything — contrary to widespread popular belief, it has very little to tell us about the details of human nature and human behaviour, such as language, culture, and sexuality.

The Continuous and the Discrete

Michael J. White — 2011-10-03

Author:: Michael J. White
ISBN:: 9780198239529
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198239529.001.0001
Published in print:: 1992
Published Online:: 2011-10-03

This book presents a detailed analysis of three ancient models of spatial magnitude, time, and local motion. The book connects the Aristotelian model, which represents spatial magnitude, time, and motion as infinitely divisible and continuous, with the standard ancient geometrical conception of extended magnitude: it is a model which represents the marriage of physical theory and mathematical orthodoxy. In the second half the book discusses two ancient alternatives to the Aristotelian model: ‘quantum’ models, and a Stoic model according to which limit entities such as points, (one-dimensional) edges, and (two-dimensional) surfaces do not exist in (physical) reality. Both these alternative models deny the applicability of standard ‘Euclidean’ ancient geometry to the physical world. A unique feature of the book is the discussion of these ancient models within the context of later philosophical, scientific, and mathematical developments. A basic assumption of the book's approach is that such a contemporary perspective can deepen our understanding not only of ancient philosophy, physics, and mathematics, but also of later developments in the content and methodology of these disciplines.

The Comprehensibility of the Universe

Nicholas Maxwell — 2011-10-03

Author:: Nicholas Maxwell
ISBN:: 9780199261550
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199261550.001.0001
Published in print:: 2003
Published Online:: 2011-10-03

This book puts forward a radically new conception of science. According to the orthodox conception, scientific theories are accepted and rejected impartially with respect to evidence, no permanent assumption being made about the world independently of the evidence. The book argues that this orthodox view is untenable. It urges that in its place a new orthodoxy is needed, which sees science as making a hierarchy of metaphysical assumptions about the comprehensibility and knowability of the universe, these assumptions asserting less and less as one ascends the hierarchy. This view has significant implications: that it is part of scientific knowledge that the universe is physically comprehensible; that metaphysics and philosophy are central to scientific knowledge; that science possesses a rational, if fallible, method of discovery; that a new understanding of scientific method and rationality is required. The book argues that this new conception makes possible a natural resolution of long-standing philosophical problems about science, regarding simplicity, induction, and progress. The book’s goal is the reform not just of the philosophy of science but of science itself, and the healing of the rift between the two.

Probabilities in Physics

Claus Beisbart and Stephan Hartmann — 2011-09-22

Author:: ClausBeisbartDortmund University of TechnologyStephanHartmannTilburg Universityhttp://www.tilburguniversity.edu/webwijs/show/?uid=s.hartmann
ISBN:: 9780199577439
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, Metaphysics/Epistemology
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199577439.001.0001
Published in print:: 2011
Published Online:: 2011-09-22

Many theories and models from physics are probabilistic. This observation raises several philosophical questions: What are probabilities in physics? Do they reflect objective chances which exist independently of the human mind? Or do they only express subjective credences and thus capture our own uncertainty about the world? Finally, which metaphysical lessons, if at all, can one draw from the largely probabilistic character of physics? The chapters collected in this volume address these questions and provide a detailed philosophical appraisal of the status of probabilities in all of physics. Particular emphasis is laid upon statistical physics and quantum mechanics. Many chapters reflect a desire to understand probabilities from physics as objective chances. These chances are characterized, e.g., as time-averages, as probabilities from a best system in the terms of David Lewis, or using the Boltzmannian typicality approach. Other chapters are sympathetic to a Bayesian view of probabilities in physics. The chapters about quantum mechanics elucidate the peculiar characteristics of quantum correlations and discuss strategies to justify the Born Rule. Finally, the chapters of this volume demonstrate how closely interpretive issues about probabilities are entangled with other foundational problems of physics such as the Reversibility Paradox, the ontology of the quantum world and the question whether the world is deterministic.

A Perfect Moral Storm

Stephen M. Gardiner — 2011-09-22

Author:: Stephen M. Gardiner
ISBN:: 9780195379440
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379440.001.0001
Published in print:: 2011
Published Online:: 2011-09-22

Climate change is genuinely global, dominantly intergenerational, and takes place in a setting where our prescriptive theories are weak. This “perfect moral storm” poses a profound challenge to humanity. This book explains the storm, how it makes sense of our current malaise, and why better ethics can help. This book argues that despite decades of awareness, we are currently accelerating hard into the climate problem in a way that defies standard explanations. It claims that this suggests that our current focus on the scientific and economic questions is too narrow, and that the tendency to see the political problem as a traditional tragedy of the commons facing nation states is too optimistic. Instead, the key issue is that the current generation, and especially the most affluent, are in a position to pass on most of the costs of their behavior (and especially the most serious harms) to the global poor, future generations and nonhuman nature. This tyranny of the contemporary is a deeper problem than the traditional tragedy of the commons. Moreover, the book argues that this diagnosis helps to explain both the past failures of international climate policy (e.g., the “shadow solutions” of Kyoto and Copenhagen), and the current push towards geoengineering. Part of the solution, it argues, is better public ethics. We must work harder on articulating both the ethical problem, and moral constraints on solutions. In addition, there is a role for “defensive” moral and political philosophy, aimed at preserving the quality of public discourse.

Life Before Birth

Bonnie Steinbock — 2011-09-22

Author:: Bonnie Steinbock
ISBN:: 9780195341621
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195341621.001.0001
Published in print:: 2011
Published Online:: 2011-09-22

This book provides a coherent framework for addressing bioethical issues in which the moral status of embryos and fetuses is relevant. It is based on the “interest view,” which ascribes moral standing to beings with interests, and connects the possession of interests with the capacity for conscious awareness or sentience. The theoretical framework is applied to up-to-date ethical and legal topics, including abortion, prenatal torts, wrongful life, the crime of feticide, substance abuse by pregnant women, compulsory cesareans, assisted reproduction, and stem cell research. Along the way, difficult philosophical problems, such as identity and the nonidentity problem are thoroughly explored.

Interpreting Quantum Theories

Laura Ruetsche — 2011-09-22

Author:: Laura Ruetsche
ISBN:: 9780199535408
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199535408.001.0001
Published in print:: 2011
Published Online:: 2011-09-22

QM∞ includes quantum field theory and the thermodynamic limit of quantum statistical mechanics — theories which, unlike the ‘ordinary’ quantum theories typically discussed by philosophers, concern infinite systems. The mathematical framework appropriate for the presentation of a theory of ordinary quantum mechanics is essentially unique. For theories of QM∞, this is not so. This prompts interpretive questions—for instance, about what makes a quantum theory the quantum theory it is — this work aims to chronicle. Having introduced a formal apparatus (operator algebra theory) suited to pursue these questions, the book articulates a variety of accounts of the content of quantum theories, accounts responsive to QM∞'s characteristic non-uniqueness. To evaluate these accounts, the book examines QM∞ settings (e.g. spontaneous symmetry breaking, cosmological particle creation, superconductivity) in which that characteristic non-uniqueness seems to matter, with a view toward determining which accounts sustain the uses to which the non-uniqueness is put. This approach not only brings work on the foundations of quantum theories in contact with the foundational investigation of other sorts of physical theories (e.g., thermodynamics, statistical mechanics, solid state physics, general relativity, and cosmology), it also brings the philosophy of physics in contact with other sorts of philosophy of science (e.g., accounts of explanation, reduction, and explanationist defenses of scientific realism). The book concludes that received notions of physical content and physical modality must be revised if they are to apply usefully to particular physical theories.

Geometric Possibility

Gordon Belot — 2011-09-22

Author:: Gordon Belot
ISBN:: 9780199595327
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199595327.001.0001
Published in print:: 2011
Published Online:: 2011-09-22

Relationalism about space is a venerable doctrine that is enjoying renewed attention among philosophers and physicists. Relationalists deny that space is ontologically prior to matter and seek to ground all claims about the structure of space in facts about actual and possible configurations of matter. Thus, many relationalists maintain that to say that space is infinite is to say that certain sorts of infinite arrays of material points are possible (even if, in fact, the world contains only a finite amount of matter). This book investigates the distinctive notion of geometric possibility that relationalists rely upon. Its over‐arching strategy is to examine the prospects for adapting to the geometric case the standard philosophical accounts of the related notion of physical possibility. The central chapters of the book examine Humean, primitivist, and necessitarian accounts of physical and geometric possibility.

Philosophy of Science Matters

Gregory J. Morgan — 2011-05-01

Author:: Gregory J.MorganStevens Institute of Technologyhttp://www.stevens.edu/cal/faculty_profile.php?faculty_id=1434
ISBN:: 9780199738625
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199738625.001.0001
Published in print:: 2011
Published Online:: 2011-05-01

In this, the first book devoted to Peter Achinstein's influential work in philosophy of science, twenty distinguished philosophers, including four Lakatos award winners, address various aspects of Achinstein's influential views on the nature of scientific evidence, scientific explanation, and scientific realism. It includes short chapters by Steve Gimbel and Jeff Maynes, Nancy Cartwright, Jordi Cat, Victor DiFate, Jerry Doppelt, Adam Goldstein, Philip Kitcher, Fred Kronz, Deborah Mayo, Greg Morgan, Helen Longino, John Norton, Michael Ruse, Bas van Fraassen, Stathis Psillos, Larry Laudan, Richard Richards, Kent Staley, and Jim Woodward with replies to each chapter from Peter Achinstein. The book aims to provide an understanding of the current debate in multiple areas of philosophy of science and how various contemporary issues are connected.

John Locke and Natural Philosophy

Peter R. Anstey — 2011-05-01

Author:: Peter R. Anstey
ISBN:: 9780199589777
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, History of Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589777.001.0001
Published in print:: 2011
Published Online:: 2011-05-01

This book studies Locke's views on the content and method of natural philosophy. Focusing on his Essay concerning Human Understanding, but also drawing extensively from Locke's other writings and manuscript remains, it argues that Locke was an advocate of the Experimental Philosophy: the new approach to natural philosophy championed by Robert Boyle and the early Royal Society. On the question of method, this study demonstrates how Locke's pessimism about the prospects for a demonstrative science of nature led him, in the Essay, to promote Francis Bacon's method of natural history, and to downplay the value of hypotheses and analogical reasoning in science. Yet, it is argued, Locke never abandoned the ideal of a demonstrative natural philosophy, for he believed that, if we could discover the primary qualities of the tiny corpuscles that constitute material bodies, we could then establish a kind of corpuscular metric that would allow us a genuine science of nature. It was only after the publication of the Essay, however, that Locke came to realize that Newton's Principia provided a different model for the role of demonstrative reasoning in science, a model based on principles established by observation. This led Locke to make significant revisions to his views in the 1690s. On the content of Locke's natural philosophy, this book argues that, even though Locke adhered to the Experimental Philosophy he, was not averse to speculation about the corpuscular nature of matter. It takes us into new terrain and new interpretations of Locke's thought through an exploration of his mercurialist transmutational chymistry, his theory of generation by seminal principles, and his conventionalism about species.

Is a Little Pollution Good for You?

Kevin Elliott — 2011-01-01

Author:: Kevin Elliott
ISBN:: 9780199755622
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199755622.001.0001
Published in print:: 2011
Published Online:: 2011-01-01

This book examines a variety of ways in which societal values can be more effectively integrated into the numerous judgments associated with policy‐relevant environmental research. It provides a detailed analysis of contemporary research on the hypothesis of hormesis (i.e., beneficial biological effects caused by low‐dose exposure to pollutants that are ordinarily toxic). On the basis of this analysis, as well as shorter case studies of endocrine disruption and multiple chemical sensitivity, the book proposes three lessons. First, university conflict‐of‐interest policies are significantly limited in their ability to prevent interest groups from “hijacking” academic research on sensitive policy‐relevant topics. Therefore, alternative strategies are needed to preserve science that serves the public interest. Second, concerned citizens and policy makers need to more carefully determine the most appropriate forms of broadly based deliberation to be employed in response to specific areas of sensitive, policy‐relevant research. Third, the principle of informed consent, which currently provides guidance in the medical field, suggests a promising ethical framework that can help environmental scientists who disseminate debated findings to the public. Throughout, the book highlights many of the crucial ethical and societal questions surrounding research on the hormesis hypothesis. It thereby constitutes the first book‐length manuscript to provide guidance to the concerned citizens, industry groups, scientists, and policy makers who are exploring ways to respond to this phenomenon.

Intuition, Imagination, and Philosophical Methodology

Tamar Szabó Gendler — 2011-01-01

Author:: Tamar Szabó Gendler
ISBN:: 9780199589760
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199589760.001.0001
Published in print:: 2010
Published Online:: 2011-01-01

This volume consists of fourteen chapters that focus on a trio of interrelated themes. First: what are the powers and limits of appeals to intuition in supporting or refuting various sorts of claims? Second: what are the cognitive consequences of engaging with content that is represented as imaginary or otherwise unreal? Third: what are the implications of these issues for the methodology of philosophy more generally? These themes are explored in a variety of cases, including thought experiments in science and philosophy, early childhood pretense, self‐deception, cognitive and emotional engagement with fiction, mental and motor imagery, automatic and habitual behavior, and social categorization. The chapters are organized into two large sections. Those in Part I—six in all—explore the role of intuition and thought experiment in science and philosophy; those in Part II—the remaining eight—look more generally at the role of imagination in a range of domains. Within each section, the chapters are grouped into pairs. In Part I, the first two look at the role of thought experiments in science; the next two at the role of thought experiments in exploring philosophical questions about personal identity; and the final two at a number of issues concerning intuitions and philosophical methodology more generally. In Part II, the first two chapters explore the relation between pretense and belief; the next two look at the phenomenon of imaginative resistance; the next two consider issues of imagination and emotion; and the final two introduce and discuss an attitude that the book calls alief.

The Collapse of Mechanism and the Rise of Sensibility

Stephen Gaukroger — 2011-01-01

Author:: Stephen Gaukroger
ISBN:: 9780199594931
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science, General
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199594931.001.0001
Published in print:: 2010
Published Online:: 2011-01-01

Understanding the emergence of a scientific culture—one in which cognitive values generally are modelled on, or subordinated to, scientific ones—is one of the foremost historical and philosophical problems with which we are now confronted in understanding our own culture. The significance of the emergence of such scientific values lies above all in their ability to provide the criteria by which we come to appraise cognitive enquiry, which shapes our understanding of what it can achieve. The period between the 1680s and the middle of the eighteenth century is a very distinctive one in this development. It is then that we witness the emergence of the idea that scientific values form a model for all cognitive claims. It is also at this time that science explicitly goes beyond technical expertise and begins to articulate a world‐view designed to displace others, whether humanist or Christian. However, what occurred took place in a peculiar and overdetermined fashion, and the outcome in the mid‐eighteenth century was not the triumph of ‘reason’, as has commonly been supposed, but rather a simultaneous elevation of the standing of science and the beginnings of a serious questioning of whether science offers a comprehensive form of understanding.

Persistence and Spacetime

Yuri Balashov — 2010-09-01

Author:: Yuri Balashov
ISBN:: 9780199579921
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199579921.001.0001
Published in print:: 2010
Published Online:: 2010-09-01

Material objects persist through time and survive change. How do they manage to do so? What are the underlying facts of persistence? Do objects persist by being ”wholly present” at all moments of time at which they exist? Or do they persist by having distinct ”temporal segments” confined to the corresponding times? Are objects three‐dimensional entities extended in space, but not in time? Or are they four‐dimensional spacetime ”worms”? These are matters of intense debate, which is now driven by concerns about two major issues in fundamental ontology: parthood and location. It is in this context that broadly empirical considerations are increasingly brought to bear on the debate about persistence. The book explores this decidedly positive tendency. It begins by stating major rival views of persistence—endurance, perdurance, and exdurance—in a spacetime framework and proceeds to investigate the implications of Einstein's theory of relativity for the debate about persistence. The overall conclusion—that relativistic considerations favor four‐dimensionalism over three‐dimensionalism—is hardly surprising. It is, however, anything but trivial. Contrary to a common misconception, there is no straightforward argument from relativity to four‐dimensionalism. The issues involved are complex, and the debate is closely entangled with a number of other philosophical disputes, including those about the nature and ontology of time, parts and wholes, material constitution, causation and properties, and vagueness.

Many Worlds?

Simon Saunders, Jonathan Barrett, Adrian Kent, and David Wallace — 2010-09-01

Author:: SimonSaundersUniversity of OxfordJonathanBarrettUniversity of BristolAdrianKentUniversity of Cambridgehttp://www.damtp.cam.ac.uk/people/a.p.a.kent/DavidWallaceUniversity of Oxfordhttp://www.philosophy.ox.ac.uk/members/david_wallace
ISBN:: 9780199560561
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199560561.001.0001
Published in print:: 2010
Published Online:: 2010-09-01

What does realism about the quantum state imply? What follows when quantum theory is applied without restriction, if need be, to the whole universe? These are the questions which are debated in this book. All the chapters start from the point of realism, and based on the need, or the aspiration, for a theory that unites micro- and macroworlds, at least in principle. But the further claim argued by some is that if you allow the Schrödinger equation unrestricted application, supposing the quantum state to be something physically real, then this universe is one of countlessly many others, constantly branching in time, all of which are real. The result is the many worlds theory, also known as the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics. The contrary claim sees this picture of many worlds as in no sense inherent in quantum mechanics, even when the latter is allowed unrestricted scope and even given that the quantum state itself is something physically real. For this picture of branching worlds fails to make physical sense, let alone common sense, even on its own terms. The status of these worlds, what they are made of, is never adequately explained. Ordinary ideas about time and identity over time become hopelessly compromised. The concept of probability itself is brought into question. This picture of many branching worlds is inchoate, it is a vision, an error. There are realist alternatives to many worlds, some even that preserve the Schrödinger equation unchanged. Twenty chapters, accompanied by commentaries and discussions, examine these claims and counterclaims in depth. They focus first on the question of ontology, the existence of worlds, second on the interpretation of probability, and third on alternatives or additions to many worlds. The introduction offers a helpful guide to the arguments for the Everett interpretation, particularly as they have been formulated in the last two decades.

Signals

Brian Skyrms — 2010-05-01

Author:: Brian Skyrms
ISBN:: 9780199580828
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Language, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199580828.001.0001
Published in print:: 2010
Published Online:: 2010-05-01

This book presents an exploration of how fundamental signals are to our world. It uses a variety of tools — theories of signaling games, information, evolution, and learning — to investigate how meaning and communication develop. The book shows how signaling games themselves evolve, and introduces a new model of learning with invention. The juxtaposition of atomic signals leads to complex signals, as the natural product of gradual process. Signals operate in networks of senders and receivers at all levels of life. Information is transmitted, but it is also processed in various ways. That is how we think — signals run around a very complicated signaling network. Signaling is a key ingredient in the evolution of teamwork, in the human but also in the animal world, even in micro-organisms. Communication and co-ordination of action are different aspects of the flow of information, and are both effected by signals.

Love, Friendship, and the Self

Bennett W. Helm — 2010-05-01

Author:: Bennett W. Helm
ISBN:: 9780199567898
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Moral Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199567898.001.0001
Published in print:: 2010
Published Online:: 2010-05-01

Recent Western thought has consistently emphasized the individualistic strand in our understanding of persons at the expense of the social strand. Thus, it is generally thought that persons are self-determining and autonomous, where these are understood to be capacities we exercise most fully on our own, apart from others, whose influence on us tends to undermine that autonomy. This book argues that we must reject a strongly individualistic conception of persons if we are to make sense of significant interpersonal relationships and the importance they can have in our lives. It presents a new account of love as intimate identification and of friendship as a kind of plural agency, in each case grounding and analyzing these notions in terms of interpersonal emotions. At the centre of this account is an analysis of how our emotional connectedness with others is essential to our very capacities for autonomy and self-determination: we are rational and autonomous only because of and through our inherently social nature. By focusing on the role that relationships of love and friendship have, both in the initial formation of our selves and in the on-going development and maturation of adult persons, the book significantly alters our understanding of persons and the kind of psychology we persons have as moral and social beings.

Everywhere and Everywhen

Nick Huggett — 2010-05-01

Author:: Nick Huggett
ISBN:: 9780195379518
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195379518.001.0001
Published in print:: 2010
Published Online:: 2010-05-01

Everywhere and Everywhen is an introduction to the ideas and arguments of the central questions that arise when physics meets philosophy: for instance, what are space and time? What are Zeno's paradoxes? Are there just three dimensions? Are there other universes? What is the shape of space and how do we know? Why does time seem to pass while space does not? What is the difference between the past and future? Is time travel possible? What is spacetime? What is time according to relativity? What is the difference between left and right? What is a quantum particle? Some of these questions are among the oldest humanity has asked about our place in the world, but some are among the most recent: the book both explores their history and the thinkers that have shaped them, and explains the fundamentals of their current understanding. Readers aren't just spectators to the journey, but are engaged in the debates. This book shows that philosophy, by analyzing fundamental concepts and their relationship to the human experience, has a great deal to say about these profound topics. They are not reserved for physics; as the book demonstrates, philosophy can not only address but help advance our view of our deepest questions about the universe, space, and time, and their implications for humanity. It is aimed at inspiring the reader to think philosophically about the universe revealed by physics.

Emergence in Mind

Cynthia Macdonald and Graham Macdonald — 2010-05-01

Author:: CynthiaMacdonaldQueen's University, Belfasthttp://www.qub.ac.uk/schools/SchoolofPoliticsInternationalStudiesandPhilosophy/Staff/Macdonald/GrahamMacdonaldQueen's University, Belfast and University of Canterbury, New Zealandhttp://www.hums.canterbury.ac.nz/phil/people/g_macdonald.shtml
ISBN:: 9780199583621
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199583621.001.0001
Published in print:: 2010
Published Online:: 2010-05-01

There have long been controversies about how it is that minds can fit into a physical universe. Emergence in Mind presents new essays by a group of philosophers investigating whether mental properties can be said to ‘emerge’ from the physical processes in the universe. Such emergence requires mental properties to be different from physical properties, and much of the discussion relates to what the consequences of such a difference might be in areas such as freedom of the will, and the possibility of scientific explanations of non-physical (for example, social) phenomena. The volume also extends the debate about emergence by considering the independence of chemical properties from physical properties, and investigating what would need to be the case for there to be groups that could be said to exercise rationality.

Putting Metaphysics First

Michael Devitt — 2010-02-01

Author:: Michael Devitt
ISBN:: 9780199280803
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199280803.001.0001
Published in print:: 2009
Published Online:: 2010-02-01

The book has two parts: one metaphysical, the other epistemological. The metaphysical part is largely concerned with realism issues. It starts with realism about universals, dismissing Plato's notorious ‘one over many’ problem. Several chapters argue for a fairly uncompromisingly realist view of the external physical world of commonsense and science. Both the nonfactualism of moral noncognitivism and positivistic instrumentalism, and deflationism about truth, are found to rest on antirealisms about their subject matters that are hard to characterize. A case is presented for moral realism. Various biological realisms are considered. Finally, an argument is presented for an unfashionable biological essentialism. The epistemological part of the book argues against the a priori and for a Quinean naturalism. The intuitions that so dominate ‘armchair philosophy’ are empirical not a priori. There is an emphasis throughout the book on distinguishing metaphysical issues about what there is and what it's like from semantic issues about meaning, truth, and reference. Another central theme, captured in the title, is that we should ‘put metaphysics first’. We should approach epistemology and semantics from a metaphysical perspective rather than vice versa. The epistemological turn in modern philosophy and the linguistic turn in contemporary philosophy were something of disasters.

Being Reduced

Jakob Hohwy and Jesper Kallestrup — 2010-02-01

Author:: JakobHohwyMonash University, Australiahttp://arts.monash.edu.au/philosophy/staff/jhohwy.phpJesperKallestrupUniversity of Edinburghhttp://www.philosophy.ed.ac.uk/people/view.php?name=jesper-kallestrup
ISBN:: 9780199211531
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199211531.001.0001
Published in print:: 2008
Published Online:: 2010-02-01

There are few more unsettling philosophical questions than this: ‘what happens in attempts to reduce some properties to some other more fundamental properties?’ Reflection on this question inevitably touches on very deep issues about ourselves, our own interactions with the world and each other, and our very understanding of what there is and what goes on around us. If we cannot command a clear view of these deep issues, then very many other debates in contemporary philosophy seem to lose traction — think of causation, laws of nature, explanation, consciousness, personal identity, intentionality, normativity, freedom, responsibility, justice, and so on. Reduction can easily seem to unravel our world. This book aims to answer this question. Its chapters span a number of current debates in philosophy and cognitive science: what is the nature of reduction, of reductive explanation, of mental causation? The chapters range from approaches in analytical metaphysics, over philosophy of the special sciences and physics, to interdisciplinary studies in psychiatry and neurobiology. The chapters connect strands in contemporary philosophy that are often treated separately, and in combination they show how issues of reduction, explanation, and causation mutually constrain each other.

Subjective Consciousness

Uriah Kriegel — 2009-09-01

Author:: Uriah Kriegel
ISBN:: 9780199570355
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570355.001.0001
Published in print:: 2009
Published Online:: 2009-09-01

Some mental events are conscious, some are unconscious. What is the difference between the two? This book offers an answer. It attempts to develop a comprehensive theory of the feature that all and only conscious mental events have. According to the theory, conscious mental events differ from unconscious ones in that, whatever else they may represent, they always also represent themselves, and do so in a very specific way. The book fleshed out this idea and argues for it.

Laws and Lawmakers Science, Metaphysics, and the Laws of Nature

Marc Lange — 2009-09-01

Author:: Marc Lange
ISBN:: 9780195328134
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195328134.001.0001
Published in print:: 2009
Published Online:: 2009-09-01

Laws of nature have long puzzled philosophers. What distinguishes laws from facts about the world that do not rise to the level of laws? How can laws be contingent and nevertheless necessary? In what sense are the laws necessary like the broadly logical truths, yet not as necessary as those truths? What are the “lawmakers”: the facts in virtue of which the laws are laws? This book offers provocative and original answers to these questions. It argues that laws are distinguished by their necessity, which is grounded in primitive subjunctive facts (expressed by counterfactual conditionals). This view avoids the notorious circularity afflicting the view that the laws are the truths that would still have held had things been different in any fashion that is logically consistent with … the laws! While recognizing that natural necessity is distinct from logical, metaphysical, and mathematical necessity, the book explains how natural necessity constitutes a species of the same genus as those other varieties of necessity. The book discusses the relation between laws and objective chances, the completeness of the laws of physics, and the laws' immutability, as well as meta-laws such as the symmetry principles so prominent in contemporary physics. It is argued that David Lewis's Humean approach to law fails to do justice the laws' necessity, and that scientific essentialist approaches fail to accommodate the way certain laws transcend the details of others.

Causation and Laws of Nature in Early Modern Philosophy

Walter Ott — 2009-09-01

Author:: Walter Ott
ISBN:: 9780199570430
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199570430.001.0001
Published in print:: 2009
Published Online:: 2009-09-01

Some philosophers think physical explanations stand on their own: what happens, happens because things have the properties they do. Others think that any such explanation is incomplete: what happens in the physical world must be partly due to the laws of nature. This book follows the debate between these views from Descartes to Hume. The book argues that the competing models of causation in the period grow out of the scholastic notion of power. On this Aristotelian view, the connection between cause and effect is logically necessary. Causes are “intrinsically directed” at what they produce. But when the Aristotelian view is faced with the challenge of mechanism, the core notion of a power splits into two distinct models, each of which persists throughout the early modern period. It is only when seen in this light that the key arguments of the period can reveal their true virtues and flaws. To make this case, the book explores such central topics as intentionality, the varieties of necessity, and the nature of relations. Arguing for controversial readings of many of the canonical figures, the book also focuses on lesser‐known writers such as Pierre‐Sylvain Régis, Nicolas Malebranche, and Robert Boyle.

Decision Theory and Rationality

José Luis Bermúdez — 2009-05-01

Author:: José Luis Bermúdez
ISBN:: 9780199548026
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199548026.001.0001
Published in print:: 2009
Published Online:: 2009-05-01

The concept of rationality is a common thread through the human and social sciences — from political science to philosophy, from economics to sociology, from management science to decision analysis. But what counts as rational action and rational behavior? This book explores decision theory as a theory of rationality. Decision theory is the mathematical theory of choice and for many social scientists it makes the concept of rationality mathematically tractable and scientifically legitimate. Yet rationality is a concept with several dimensions and the theory of rationality has different roles to play. It plays an action-guiding role (prescribing what counts as a rational solution of a given decision problem). It plays a normative role (giving us the tools to pass judgment not just on how a decision problem was solved, but also on how it was set up in the first place). And it plays a predictive/explanatory role (telling us how rational agents will behave, or why they did what they did). This book shows, first, that decision theory cannot play all of these roles simultaneously and, second, that no theory of rationality can play one role without playing the other two. The conclusion is that there is no hope of taking decision theory as a theory of rationality.

Value-Free Science?

Harold Kincaid, John Dupré, and Alison Wylie — 2009-01-01

Author:: HaroldKincaidUniversity of Alabamahttp://www.uab.edu/philosophy/faculty/kincaid/JohnDupréUniversity of Exeterhttp://socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/sociology/staff/dupre/AlisonWylieUniversity of Washingtonhttp://faculty.washington.edu/aw26/
ISBN:: 9780195308969
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195308969.001.0001
Published in print:: 2007
Published Online:: 2009-01-01

It has long been thought that science is our best hope for realizing objective knowledge but that, to deliver on this promise, it must be free of the influence of any values that are not purely epistemic. As recent work in the philosophy, history, and social studies of science shows, however, things are not so simple. Values surface in numerous aspects of the scientific enterprise. This book asks where and how non-epistemic values are involved in science; it explores the roles these values play at the heart of science, in the assessment of evidence and explanations, and it examines the implications this has for ideals of objectivity. In the process, it considers a range of concrete examples drawn from fields as diverse as development economics, evolutionary biology, medicine, neurophysiology, environmental science, and the social/historical sciences, including empirical studies of scientific practice. While the contributors to this book differ on many specifics, the chapters share the general perspective that a defensible middle ground lies between the dichotomous views that often dominate debate: that values have no place in science, or that science is nothing but covert politics.

Thought, Reference, and Experience

José Luis Bermúdez — 2009-01-01

Author:: José LuisBermúdezWashington University in St Louishttp://patty.wustl.edu/~philos/people/index.php?position_id=1&person_id=1&status=1
ISBN:: 9780199248964
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199248964.001.0001
Published in print:: 2005
Published Online:: 2009-01-01

This book presents a collection of important new chapters on topics at the intersection of philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, and philosophical logic. The starting-point for the chapters is the brilliant work of the British philosopher Gareth Evans before his untimely death in 1980 at the age of 34. Evans's work on reference and singular thought transformed the Fregean approach to the philosophy of thought and language, showing how seemingly technical issues in philosophical semantics are inextricably linked to fundamental questions about the structure of our thinking about ourselves and about the world. The chapters, all newly written for this book, explore different aspects of Evans's philosophical legacy, showing its importance to central areas in contemporary analytic philosophy. The book includes an introduction that introduces the principal themes in Evans's thought and places the chapters in context.

The Law-Governed Universe

John T. Roberts — 2009-01-01

Author:: John T. Roberts
ISBN:: 9780199557707
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199557707.001.0001
Published in print:: 2008
Published Online:: 2009-01-01

This book articulates and defends a new philosophical account of laws of nature. According to this account, lawhood is a meta‐theoretic notion: the primary concept is that of a law of a particular scientific theory; to call something a law of nature is to call it a law of whatever true theory is salient in the context. The laws of a scientific theory are the regularities implied by that theory that collectively guarantee the reliability of the empirical methods of measurement and observation that are legitimate according to that theory. Though surprising, this account of lawhood turns out to have many virtues. It makes definite predictions about which of a theory's implications should be called its laws, and these predictions appear to match our intuitive judgments. It is compatible with Humean Supervenience, but does not deflate the idea of the laws' necessity and counterfactual robustness in the way that Humean accounts usually do. It explains why laws are related to counterfactuals in the way that they are, and it illuminates the sense in which laws can be said to govern the universe. Indeed, if the overall argument of the book succeeds, then this account is the only philosophical account of lawhood that can simultaneously make sense of the idea that laws of nature govern the universe and make sense of how empirical science can teach us that we live in a law‐governed universe.

Explaining the Brain

Carl F. Craver — 2009-01-01

Author:: Carl F. Craver
ISBN:: 9780199299317
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199299317.001.0001
Published in print:: 2007
Published Online:: 2009-01-01

What distinguishes good explanations in neuroscience from bad? This book constructs and defends standards for evaluating neuroscientific explanations that are grounded in a systematic view of what neuroscientific explanations are: descriptions of multilevel mechanisms. In developing this approach, it draws on a wide range of examples in the history of neuroscience (e.g., Hodgkin and Huxley's model of the action potential and LTP as a putative explanation for different kinds of memory), as well as recent philosophical work on the nature of scientific explanation.

Scientific Representation

Bas C. van Fraassen — 2008-09-01

Author:: Bas C. van Fraassen
ISBN:: 9780199278220
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199278220.001.0001
Published in print:: 2008
Published Online:: 2008-09-01

Science represents natural phenomena by means of theories, as well as in many concrete ways by such means as pictures, graphs, table-top models, and computer simulations. This book begins with an inquiry into the nature of representation in general, drawing on such diverse sources as Plato's dialogues, the development of perspectival drawing in the Renaissance, and the geometric styles of modeling in modern physics. Starting with Mach's and Poincaré's analyses of measurement and Reichenbach's ‘problem of coordination’, this book presents a view of measurement outcomes as representations achieved in a process of mutual stabilization of theory and empirical inquiry. With respect to the theories of contemporary science, the book defends an empiricist structuralist version of the ‘picture theory’ of science, compatible with a constructive empiricist view, through an inquiry into the paradoxes that came to light in 20th-century philosophies of science. It is argued that indexicality enters irreducibly into the conditions of use and application of measurement, models, and theories. The book concludes with an analysis of the complex relationship between appearance and reality in the scientific world-picture, arguing against the completeness criterion that demands a derivation of the appearances from the theoretically postulated reality.

Images of Empiricism

Bradley Monton — 2008-01-01

Author:: BradleyMontonUniversity of Colorado at Boulderhttp://www.colorado.edu/philosophy/fac_monton.shtml
ISBN:: 9780199218844
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199218844.001.0001
Published in print:: 2007
Published Online:: 2008-01-01

This book contains thirteen specially written chapters which discuss topics from the work of Bas C. van Fraassen, one of the most important contemporary philosophers of science. The central and unifying theme of the book is empiricism, an approach which van Fraassen developed most fully in The Scientific Image and The Empirical Stance. Thirteen experts examine van Fraassen's defence of scientific anti-realism (which he sees as a core tenet of empiricism), as well as his claim that adopting a philosophical position like empiricism does not consist of holding a particular set of beliefs, but is rather a matter of taking a stance. The book concludes with an extensive and intriguing reply by van Fraassen, in which he develops and corrects his old views, and offers new insights into the nature of science, empiricism, and philosophy itself.

Gauging What's Real

Richard Healey — 2008-01-01

Author:: Richard Healey
ISBN:: 9780199287963
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199287963.001.0001
Published in print:: 2007
Published Online:: 2008-01-01

Gauge theories have provided our best representations of the fundamental forces of nature. But a representation may be successfully employed even without a clear understanding of how it works. This book seeks such understanding, so that we are able to say what kind of world our gauge theories reveal to us. A gauge theory's representations are mathematical structures that may be transformed while certain features remain the same. Do representations related by such a gauge transformation merely offer alternative perspectives on the same situation? If so, then gauge symmetry is a purely formal property since it reflects no corresponding symmetry in nature. This book describes the representations provided by gauge theories in both classical and quantum physics. It argues that gauge symmetry is a purely formal property of almost all classes of representations these provide. Evidence for classical gauge theories of forces (other than gravity) gives us reason to believe that loops rather than points are the locations of fundamental properties. Besides exploring whether this holds also for the quantum gauge field theories of the Standard Model of elementary particle physics, the book assesses the difficulties involved in basing such ontological conclusions on the success of these theories.

Across the Boundaries

Daniel Steel — 2008-01-01

Author:: Daniel Steel
ISBN:: 9780195331448
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195331448.001.0001
Published in print:: 2007
Published Online:: 2008-01-01

The biological and social sciences often generalize causal conclusions from one context to others that may differ in some relevant respects, as is illustrated by inferences from animal models to humans or from a pilot study to a broader population. Inferences like these are known as extrapolations. How and when extrapolation can be legitimate is a fundamental question for the biological and social sciences that has not received the attention it deserves. This book argues that previous accounts of extrapolation are inadequate and proposes a better approach that is able to answer methodological critiques of extrapolation from animal models to humans.

Every Thing Must Go

James Ladyman, Don Ross, and and David Spurrett with John Collier — 2007-09-01

Author:: James Ladyman, Don Ross, and David Spurrett with John Collier
ISBN:: 9780199276196
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Metaphysics/Epistemology, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199276196.001.0001
Published in print:: 2007
Published Online:: 2007-09-01

This book argues that the only kind of metaphysics that can contribute to objective knowledge is one based specifically on contemporary science as it really is, and not on philosophers' a priori intuitions, common sense, or simplifications of science. In addition to showing how recent metaphysics has drifted away from connection with all other serious scholarly inquiry as a result of not heeding this restriction, this book demonstrates how to build a metaphysics compatible with current fundamental physics (“ontic structural realism”), which, when combined with metaphysics of the special sciences (“rainforest realism”), can be used to unify physics with the other sciences without reducing these sciences to physics itself. Taking science metaphysically seriously, this book argues, means that metaphysicians must abandon the picture of the world as composed of self-subsistent individual objects, and the paradigm of causation as the collision of such objects. The text assesses the role of information theory and complex systems theory in attempts to explain the relationship between the special sciences and physics, treading a middle road between the grand synthesis of thermodynamics and information, and eliminativism about information. The consequences of the books' metaphysical theory for central issues in the philosophy of science are explored, including the implications for the realism versus empiricism debate, the role of causation in scientific explanations, the nature of causation and laws, the status of abstract and virtual objects, and the objective reality of natural kinds.

Evolution and the Levels of Selection

Samir Okasha — 2007-01-01

Author:: Samir Okasha
ISBN:: 9780199267972
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199267972.001.0001
Published in print:: 2006
Published Online:: 2007-01-01

Does natural selection act primarily on individual organisms, on groups, on genes, or on whole species? This book provides a comprehensive analysis of the long-standing controversy in evolutionary biology over the levels of selection, focusing on conceptual, philosophical, and foundational questions. In the first half of the book, a systematic framework is developed for thinking about natural selection acting at multiple levels of the biological hierarchy; the framework is then used to help resolve outstanding issues. Considerable attention is paid to the concept of causality as it relates to the levels of selection, particularly the idea that natural selection at one hierarchical level can have effects that ‘filter’ up or down to other levels. Full account is taken of the recent biological literature on ‘major evolutionary transitions’ and the recent resurgence of interest in multi-level selection theory among biologists. Other biological topics discussed include Price's equation, kin and group selection, the gene's eye view, evolutionary game theory, selfish genetic elements, species and clade selection, and the evolution of individuality. Philosophical topics discussed include reductionism and holism, causation and correlation, the nature of hierarchical organization, and realism and pluralism about the levels of selection.

Physical Relativity

Harvey R. Brown — 2006-09-01

Author:: Harvey R. Brown
ISBN:: 9780199275830
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/0199275831.001.0001
Published in print:: 2005
Published Online:: 2006-09-01

This book explores the nature of the distinction at the heart of Einstein's 1905 formulation of his special theory of relativity: that between kinematics and dynamics. Einstein himself became increasingly uncomfortable with this distinction, and with the limitations of what he called the ‘principle theory’ approach inspired by the logic of thermodynamics. A handful of physicists and philosophers have over the last century likewise expressed doubts about Einstein's treatment of the relativistic behaviour of rigid bodies and clocks in motion in the kinematical part of his great paper, and suggested that the dynamical understanding of length contraction and time dilation intimated by the immediate precursors of Einstein is more fundamental. This book both examines and extends these arguments (which support a more ‘constructive’ approach to relativistic effects in Einstein's terminology), after giving a careful analysis of key features of the pre-history of relativity theory. It argues furthermore that the geometrization of the theory by Minkowski in 1908 brought illumination, but not a causal explanation of relativistic effects. Finally, the book tries to show that the dynamical interpretation of special relativity defended in the book is consistent with the role this theory must play as a limiting case of Einstein's 1915 theory of gravity: the general theory of relativity.

The Language and Reality of Time

Thomas Sattig — 2006-09-01

Author:: Thomas Sattig
ISBN:: 9780199279524
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/0199279527.001.0001
Published in print:: 2006
Published Online:: 2006-09-01

The book develops a comprehensive framework for doing philosophy of time. It brings together a variety of different perspectives, linking the ordinary conception of time with the physicist’s conception, and linking questions about time addressed in metaphysics with questions addressed in the philosophy of language. Within this framework, the book explores the temporal dimension of the material world in relation to the temporal dimension of our ordinary discourse about the world. The discussion is centred around the dispute between three-dimensionalists and four-dimensionalists about whether the temporal profile of ordinary objects mirrors their spatial profile. Are ordinary objects extended in time in the same way in which they are extended in space? Do they have temporal as well as spatial parts? Four-dimensionalists say ‘yes’, three-dimensionalists say ‘no’. The book develops an original three-dimensionalist picture of the material world, and argues that this picture is preferable to its four-dimensionalists rivals if ordinary thought and talk are taken seriously. Among the issues discussed are the metaphysics of persistence, change, composition, location, coincidence, and relativity; the ontology of past, present, and future; and the semantics of predication, tense, temporal modifiers, and sortal terms.

Identity in Physics

Steven French and Décio Krause — 2006-09-01

Author:: Steven French, Décio Krause
ISBN:: 9780199278244
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/0199278245.001.0001
Published in print:: 2006
Published Online:: 2006-09-01

Drawing on philosophical accounts of identity and individuality, as well as the histories of both classical and quantum physics, this book explores two alternative metaphysical approaches to quantum particles. It asks if quantum particles can be regarded as individuals, just like books, tables, and people. Taking the first approach, the book argues that if quantum particles are regarded as individuals, then Leibniz’s famous Principle of the Identity of Indiscernibles is in fact violated. Recent discussions of this conclusion are analysed in detail and the costs involved in saving the Principle are carefully considered. For the second approach, the book considers recent work in non-standard logic and set theory to indicate how we can make sense of the idea that objects can be non-individuals. The concluding chapter suggests how these results might then be extended to quantum field theory.

Exceeding Our Grasp

P. Kyle Stanford — 2006-05-01

Author:: P. Kyle Stanford
ISBN:: 9780195174083
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/0195174089.001.0001
Published in print:: 2006
Published Online:: 2006-05-01

The incredible achievements of modern scientific theories lead most of us to embrace scientific realism: the view that our best theories offer us at least roughly accurate descriptions of otherwise inaccessible parts of the world like genes, atoms, and the big bang. This book argues that careful attention to the history of scientific investigation invites a challenge to this view that is not well represented in contemporary debates about the nature of the scientific enterprise. The historical record of scientific inquiry, the book suggests, is characterized by the problem of unconceived alternatives. Past scientists have routinely failed even to conceive of alternatives to their own theories and lines of theoretical investigation, alternatives that were both well-confirmed by the evidence available at the time and sufficiently serious as to be ultimately accepted by later scientific communities. The book supports this claim with a detailed investigation of the mid-to-late 19th-century theories of inheritance and generation proposed in turn by Charles Darwin, Francis Galton, and August Weismann. It goes on to argue that this historical pattern strongly suggests that there are equally well-confirmed and scientifically serious alternatives to our own best theories that remain currently unconceived. Moreover, this challenge is more serious than those rooted in either the so-called pessimistic induction or the underdetermination of theories by evidence, in part because existing realist responses to these latter challenges offer no relief from the problem of unconceived alternatives itself.

Science and Partial Truth

Newton C. A. da Costa and Steven French — 2006-02-01

Author:: Newton C. A. da Costa, Steven French
ISBN:: 9780195156515
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/019515651X.001.0001
Published in print:: 2003
Published Online:: 2006-02-01

In the past thirty years, two fundamental issues have emerged in the philosophy of science. One concerns the appropriate attitude we should take towards scientific theories — whether we should regard them as true or merely empirically adequate, for example. The other concerns the nature of scientific theories and models and how these might best be represented. This book looks at these two issues together by arguing that theories and models should be regarded as partially rather than wholly true. It adopts a framework that sheds new light on issues to do with belief, theory acceptance, and the realism-antirealism debate. The new machinery of “partial structures” that is developed here offers a new perspective from which to view the nature of scientific models and their heuristic development.

Kant and the Sciences

Eric Watkins — 2006-02-01

Author:: EricWatkinsVirginia Polytechnic Universityhttp://philosophy.ucsd.edu/faculty/ewatkins/Eric_Watkins_Webpage/Home.html
ISBN:: 9780195133059
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/0195133056.001.0001
Published in print:: 2001
Published Online:: 2006-02-01

Kant’s contributions to the central problems of philosophy — metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics — have received considerable attention. What is far less studied is his interest in the sciences. This book reveals the deep unity of Kant’s conception of science as it bears on the particular sciences of his day (such as physics, chemistry, anthropology, history, psychology, and biology), and on his conception of philosophy’s function with respect to them. This collection of twelve essays consider different aspects of Kant’s conception of science.

A House Built on Sand

Noretta Koertge — 2006-02-01

Author:: NorettaKoertgeIndiana Universityhttp://www.indiana.edu/~hpscdept/Fac-Koertge.shtml
ISBN:: 9780195117257
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/0195117255.001.0001
Published in print:: 1998
Published Online:: 2006-02-01

The interdisciplinary enterprise of Science, Technology and Society Studies (STS) fosters the view that the results of scientific inquiry are social constructions that are strongly influenced by ideology and special interests. Academics working within traditions of postmodernism and cultural studies use both theoretical analysis and historical case studies to defend their allegations that the objectivity and empirical character of science have been vastly overrated. This anthology, with essays by philosophers, historians, scientists, and engineers, scrutinizes these claims in detail. Inspired by the Sokal hoax, these essays provide devastating refutations of the most central and widely trumpeted claims of the postmodernist critique of science. Included are clear analyses of philosophical concepts such as relativism, theory ladenness, underdetermination of theory by evidence, scientific experimentation, objectivity, the context of discovery, the role of metaphors in science, and sociology of scientific knowledge. The historical episodes discussed come from alchemy, the Scientific Revolution, Darwinian evolutionary theory, reproductive biology, particle physics, fluid mechanics, relativity theory, and statistics. Implications are drawn for science education, science journalism, science development, and the historiography of science.

Extending Ourselves

Paul Humphreys — 2006-02-01

Author:: Paul Humphreys
ISBN:: 9780195158700
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/0195158709.001.0001
Published in print:: 2004
Published Online:: 2006-02-01

Computational science, especially computer simulations, is now the dominant procedure in many areas of science. This book contains the first systematic philosophical account of this new scientific method, and draws a parallel between the ways in which such computational methods have enhanced our abilities to mathematically model the world, and the more familiar ways in which scientific instruments have expanded our access to the empirical world. This expansion forms the basis for a new kind of empiricism better suited to the needs of science than the older anthropocentric forms of empiricism. Human abilities are no longer the ultimate standard of correctness within epistemology. The book includes arguments for the primacy of properties rather than objects, for how technology interacts with scientific methods, and a detailed account of how the path from a computational template or model to a scientific application is constructed and revised. This last feature allows us to hold a form of selective realism in which anti-realist arguments based on abstract reconstructions of theories can be avoided. One important consequence of the rise of computational methods is that the traditional organization of the sciences is being replaced by an organization founded on computational templates.

Scientific Values and Civic Virtues

Noretta Koertge — 2005-07-14

Author:: NorettaKoertgeIndiana University (Emeritus)http://www.indiana.edu/~hpscdept/Fac-Koertge.shtml
ISBN:: 9780195172256
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/0195172256.001.0001
Published in print:: 2005
Published Online:: 2005-07-14

This anthology explores the nexus between scientific values and civic virtues, arguing that both scientific norms and scientific institutions can provide badly needed resources for improving the rationality of public deliberation in democratic society. In response to the growing cynicism about corruption and the influence of special interest groups, political scientists have placed more emphasis on the importance to civil society of traditional civic virtues such as justice, fairness, honesty, tolerance, and intellectual pluralism. But where are the good exemplars for such attributes? In this volume, philosophers of science show how the scientific values of truthfulness, trust, candor, integrity, empirical adequacy, and critical thinking are exemplified in scientific research. Essays by historians explore the common roots of science and democracy. Other chapters show how fundamentalist religions and postmodernist critiques of rationality can undermine both science and civil society.

The Reign of Relativity

Thomas Ryckman — 2005-04-20

Author:: Thomas Ryckman
ISBN:: 9780195177176
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/0195177177.001.0001
Published in print:: 2005
Published Online:: 2005-04-20

The general theory of relativity (1915) was also a defining event for 20th century philosophy of science. During the decisive first ten years of the theory’s existence, two main tendencies dominated its philosophical reception. It is argued that the path actually taken, which became logical empiricist philosophy of science, greatly contributed to the current impasse over scientific realism. On the other hand, new possibilities are opened in revisiting and reviving the spirit of a more sophisticated tendency, here broadly termed ‘transcendental idealism,’ a cluster of viewpoints principally associated with Ernst Cassirer, Hermann Weyl, and Arthur Eddington. In particular, Weyl’s reformulation of gravitational and electromagnetic theory within the framework of a “pure infinitesimal geometry” under the explicit inspiration of Edmund Husserl’s transcendental-phenomenological idealism is traced in detail and further articulated. It is further argued that Einstein, though initially paying lip service to the emerging philosophy of logical empiricism, ended up siding de facto with the broad contours of the transcendental idealist tendency, which is also a significant progenitor of the contemporary point of view misleadingly designated “structural realism”.

Inconsistency, Asymmetry, and Non-Locality

Mathias Frisch — 2005-04-20

Author:: Mathias Frisch
ISBN:: 9780195172157
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/0195172159.001.0001
Published in print:: 2005
Published Online:: 2005-04-20

This book has two principal aims: to investigate the conceptual structure of classical electrodynamics, and show that investigating a particular scientific theory can shed light on concerns in the general philosophy of science. It focuses on two basic issues on the interaction between charged particles and classical fields. First, what is the equation of motion of a charged particle interacting with an electromagnetic field? Second, how does the presence of charged particles or sources affect the total field? The book is divided into two parts. Part I focuses on particles — different particle equations of motion and their properties. Part II focuses on fields and their symmetry properties in the presence of particles.

Making Things Happen

James Woodward — 2005-01-20

Author:: James Woodward
ISBN:: 9780195155273
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/0195155270.001.0001
Published in print:: 2004
Published Online:: 2005-01-20

This book develops a manipulationist theory of causation and explanation: causal and explanatory relationships are relationships that are potentially exploitable for purposes of manipulation and control. The resulting theory is a species of counterfactual theory that (I claim) avoids the difficulties and counterexamples that have infected alternative accounts of causation and explanation, from the Deductive-Nomological model onwards. One of the key concepts in this theory is the notion of an intervention, which is an idealization of the notion of an experimental manipulation that is stripped of its anthropocentric elements. This notion is used to provide a characterization of causal relationships that is non-reductive but also not viciously circular. Relationships that correctly tell us how the value of one variable Y would change under interventions on a second variable Y are invariant. The notion of an invariant relationship is more helpful than the notion of a law of nature (the notion on which philosophers have traditionally relied) in understanding how explanation and causal attribution work in the special sciences.

Inventing Temperature

Hasok Chang — 2005-01-20

Author:: Hasok Chang
ISBN:: 9780195171273
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/0195171276.001.0001
Published in print:: 2004
Published Online:: 2005-01-20

This book presents the concept of “complementary science” which contributes to scientific knowledge through historical and philosophical investigations. It emphasizes the fact that many simple items of knowledge that we take for granted were actually spectacular achievements obtained only after a great deal of innovative thinking, painstaking experiments, bold conjectures, and serious controversies. Each chapter in the book consists of two parts: a narrative part that states the philosophical puzzle and gives a problem-centred narrative on the historical attempts to solve the puzzle; and the analysis part which provides in-depth analyses of certain scientific, historical, and philosophical aspects of the story.

God, the Devil, and Darwin

Niall Shanks and Richard Dawkins — 2005-01-20

Author:: Niall Shanks, Richard Dawkins
ISBN:: 9780195161991
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/0195161998.001.0001
Published in print:: 2004
Published Online:: 2005-01-20

This book introduces the intelligent design theory, which preserves the core of creation science while doing away with much of the biblical literalism and explicit references to God. It discusses the theory, where it came from, and how it is presented to the public. It argues that the theory represents a serious threat to the educational, scientific, and philosophical values of the Enlightenment that have shaped modern science and modern democratic institutions.

Theory and Truth

Lawrence Sklar — 2003-11-01

Author:: Lawrence Sklar
ISBN:: 9780199251575
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/0199251576.001.0001
Published in print:: 2002
Published Online:: 2003-11-01

Sceptics have often cast doubt on the legitimacy of claims to the effect that our best scientific theories are true. One ground for such scepticism is the fact that our theories advert to the existence and nature of unobservable entities and features of the world. Another ground for such scepticism is the fact that our theories rest upon our idealization of the world in their descriptions and explanations. A third ground for scepticism is the claim that all of our theories are but transient. If we expect even our best theories to ultimately be replaced, how can we think of them as truly describing the world? Each kind of sceptical argument plays a role within the scientific project of theory construction and evaluation itself. But there are clear and important differences between the kinds of internal role such arguments play within science and the way that they function in the more abstract philosophical context.

The Scientific Image

Bas. C. van Fraassen — 2003-11-01

Author:: Bas. C. van Fraassen
ISBN:: 9780198244271
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/0198244274.001.0001
Published in print:: 1980
Published Online:: 2003-11-01

This book presents an empiricist alternative (‘constructive empiricism’) to both logical positivism and scientific realism. Against the former, it insists on a literal understanding of the language of science and on an irreducibly pragmatic dimension of theory acceptance. Against scientific realism, it insists that the central aim of science is empirical adequacy (‘saving the phenomena’) and that even unqualified acceptance of a theory involves no more belief than that this goal is met. Beginning with a critique of the metaphysical arguments that typically accompany scientific realism, a new characterization of empirical adequacy is presented, together with an interpretation of probability in both modern and contemporary physics and a pragmatic theory of explanation.

Science, Truth, and Democracy

Philip Kitcher — 2003-11-01

Author:: Philip Kitcher
ISBN:: 9780195145830
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/0195145836.001.0001
Published in print:: 2001
Published Online:: 2003-11-01

What should be the goal of science in a democratic society? Some say, to attain the truth; others deny the possibility (or even the intelligibility) of truth‐seeking. Science, Truth, and Democracy attempts to provide a different answer. It is possible to make sense of the notion of truth, and to understand truth as correspondence to a mind‐independent world. Yet science could not hope to find the whole truth about that world. Scientific inquiry must necessarily be selective, focusing on the aspects of nature that are deemed most important. Yet how should that judgement be made? The book's answer is that the search for truth should be combined with a respect for democracy. The scientific research that should strike us as significant would address the questions singled out as most important in an informed deliberation among parties committed to each others’ well‐being. The book develops this perspective as an ideal of ‘well‐ordered science’, relating this ideal both to past efforts at science policy and to the possibility that finding the truth may not always be what we want. It concludes with a chapter on the responsibilities of scientists.

Quantum Mechanics

Bas C. van Fraassen — 2003-11-01

Author:: Bas C. van Fraassen
ISBN:: 9780198239802
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/0198239807.001.0001
Published in print:: 1991
Published Online:: 2003-11-01

Quantum theory was developed in response to a welter of new experimental phenomena, yet appeared to depict a world so esoteric as to be literally unimaginable. Interpretation of the theory became feasible only after von Neumann's theoretical unification, but von Neumann's own interpretation astonishingly implied that in measurement something happens that violates Schroedinger's equation, the theory's cornerstone. This book argues first of all that the phenomena themselves, without theoretical motives, suffice to eliminate ’common cause’ models, thus requiring a radical departure from classical physics models. The measurement process, however, has an adequate description of itself as a quantum‐mechanical process, so that the theory can be seen as complete in a relevant sense. But the question of interpretation, ‘How could the world possibly be the way this theory says it is?’, is not thereby answered. In response to that question it is argued that the theory admits a plurality of interpretations, each of which helps to understand the theory further, but also advocates one particular interpretation (the Copenhagen Variant of the Modal Interpretation). That interpretation is then applied to such topics as the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen paradox and the problem of ’identical’ particles, quantum statistics, identity, and individuation.

Nature's Capacities and Their Measurement

Nancy Cartwright — 2003-11-01

Author:: Nancy Cartwright
ISBN:: 9780198235071
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/0198235070.001.0001
Published in print:: 1994
Published Online:: 2003-11-01

This book on the philosophy of science argues for an empiricism, opposed to the tradition of David Hume, in which singular rather than general causal claims are primary; causal laws express facts about singular causes whereas the general causal claims of science are ascriptions of capacities or causal powers, capacities to make things happen. Taking science as measurement, Cartwright argues that capacities are necessary for science and that these can be measured, provided suitable conditions are met. There are case studies from both econometrics and quantum mechanics.

Laws and Symmetry

Bas C. van Fraassen — 2003-11-01

Author:: Bas C. van Fraassen
ISBN:: 9780198248606
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/0198248601.001.0001
Published in print:: 1989
Published Online:: 2003-11-01

Metaphysicians speak of laws of nature in terms of necessity and universality, and that conception played a role in the birth of modern physics some centuries ago, but today physicists speak in terms of symmetry, transformations, and invariance. Laws and Symmetry's three main objectives are: first, to show the failure of current philosophical accounts of laws of nature; second, to refute arguments for the reality of laws of nature; third, to contrib ute to an epistemology and a philosophy of science antithetical to such metaphysical notions. The latter involves an inquiry into the character and role of symmetry and of symmetry arguments in the physical sciences.

Hume's Problem

Colin Howson — 2003-11-01

Author:: Colin Howson
ISBN:: 9780198250371
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/0198250371.001.0001
Published in print:: 2000
Published Online:: 2003-11-01

This book is an extended discussion of Hume's famous sceptical argument that we have no reason to believe that the future will resemble the past. In the context of scientific methodology, this implies that however stringent the process of experimentation, the data supplied does not in itself support any one general hypothesis over another. There have been many attempts since Hume published this argument to show that it is mistaken, or that it itself begs the question. These attempts, which fall under the various headings of probabilism, reliabilism, deductivism, the No‐Miracles argument, and naturalism, are examined and are all found to be wanting. It is then argued that Hume's argument is sound, but that conceding this does not show that there are no valid inductive inferences. The final sections of the book are devoted to showing that there are such arguments, namely probabilistically valid arguments, whose premises are assignments of prior probability. Such arguments are clearly conditional, like those of deductive logic, their conclusions depending on the premises. Indeed, this book argues that the laws of probability are as authentically logical principles as those of deductive logic, mediating like them non‐ampliative inferences from premises to conclusion. Hume's position, that all inductive arguments depend on assumptions about the likely course of nature, is endorsed, since these assumptions can be identified with the prior probability assignments. Thus, though Hume was correct, there is nevertheless room for a genuine logic of inductive inference, supplied by the laws of probability.

Human Nature and the Limits of Science

John Dupré — 2003-11-01

Author:: John Dupré
ISBN:: 9780199248063
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/0199248060.001.0001
Published in print:: 2001
Published Online:: 2003-11-01

This book applies to the study of human nature the generally pluralistic metaphysics and methodology developed in the author's earlier work. It begins with detailed criticism of two popular projects for understanding human nature, evolutionary psychology, and rational‐choice theory. The argument shows how the flaws in these projects reflect deep misconceptions about the nature and the legitimate ambitions of science. Such scientific theories necessarily provide highly simplified accounts of a phenomenon as complex as human nature and can provide only a small part of the total picture of such a phenomenon. Only a pluralistic approach, an approach that combines insights from a variety of perspectives not limited to the scientific, can hope to provide anything close to an adequate account of human nature. In addition to a variety of partial perspectives from science, the humanities, and, not least, common human experience, it is argued that there is also room for a conception of human autonomy. The details of this conception, including a sketch of a novel voluntarist theory of freedom of the will, are provided in a concluding chapter.

How the Laws of Physics Lie

Nancy Cartwright — 2003-11-01

Author:: Nancy Cartwright
ISBN:: 9780198247043
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/0198247044.001.0001
Published in print:: 1983
Published Online:: 2003-11-01

Nancy Cartwright argues for a novel conception of the role of fundamental scientific laws in modern natural science. If we attend closely to the manner in which theoretical laws figure in the practice of science, we see that despite their great explanatory power these laws do not describe reality. Instead, fundamental laws describe highly idealized objects in models. Thus, the correct account of explanation in science is not the traditional covering law view, but the ‘simulacrum’ account. On this view, explanation is a matter of constructing a model that may employ, but need not be consistent with, a theoretical framework, in which phenomenological laws that are true of the empirical case in question can be derived. Anti‐realism about theoretical laws does not, however, commit one to anti‐realism about theoretical entities. Belief in theoretical entities can be grounded in well‐tested localized causal claims about concrete physical processes, sometimes now called ‘entity realism’. Such causal claims provide the basis for partial realism and they are ineliminable from the practice of explanation and intervention in nature.

The Devil in the Details

Robert W. Batterman — 2003-11-01

Author:: Robert W. Batterman
ISBN:: 9780195146479
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/0195146476.001.0001
Published in print:: 2001
Published Online:: 2003-11-01

This book focuses on a form of reasoning in science that I call “asymptotic reasoning.” At base, this type of reasoning involves methods that eliminate details and, in some sense, precision. Asymptotic reasoning has received systematic treatment in physics and applied mathematics, but virtually no attention has been paid to it by philosophers of science. I argue that once one understands the role played by asymptotic reasoning in explanatory arguments of scientists, our philosophical conceptions of explanation, reduction, and emergence require significant modification.

Critical Scientific Realism

Ilkka Niiniluoto — 2003-11-01

Author:: Ilkka Niiniluoto
ISBN:: 9780199251612
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/0199251614.001.0001
Published in print:: 2002
Published Online:: 2003-11-01

This book gives a systematic formulation of critical scientific realism by surveying varieties of realism in ontology, semantics, epistemology, theory construction, and methodology. According to the standard version of scientific realism, scientific theories are attempts to give true descriptions of mind‐independent and possibly unobservable reality, where truth means correspondence between language and reality. Critical realism adds to this view four important qualifications: our access to the world is always relative to a chosen linguistic framework (conceptual pluralism); all human knowledge about reality is uncertain and corrigible (fallibilism); even the best theories in science may fail to be true, but nevertheless, successful theories typically are close to the truth (truthlikeness); a part, but only a part, of reality consists of human‐made constructions (Popper's world 3). Niiniluoto combines Tarski's semantic definition of truth with his own explication of Popper's notion of verisimilitude, and characterizes scientific progress in terms of increasing truthlikeness. He argues in detail that critical scientific realism can be successfully defended against its most important current alternatives: instrumentalism, constructive empiricism, Kantianism, pragmatism, internal realism, relativism, social constructivism, and epistemological anarchism.

Causality and Explanation

Wesley C. Salmon — 2003-11-01

Author:: Wesley C. Salmon
ISBN:: 9780195108644
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/0195108647.001.0001
Published in print:: 1998
Published Online:: 2003-11-01

Brings together 26 of Salmon's essays, including 7 that have never before been published and others that are difficult to find. Part I (Introductory Essays: Causality, Determinism, and Explanation) comprises five essays that presuppose no formal training in philosophy of science and form a background for subsequent essays. Parts II (Scientific Explanation) and III (Causality) contain Salmon's seminal work on these topics. The essays in Part II present aspects of the evolution of the author's thought about scientific explanation, and include critical examination of the claim that explanations are arguments and a carefully reasoned defense of explanatory asymmetry. Those in Part III develop the details of the theory sketched in Ch. 1. This theory identifies causal connections with physical processes that transmit causal influence from one space‐time location to another, and it incorporates probabilistic features of causality, keeping open the possibility that causality operates in indeterministic contexts. Part IV (Concise Overviews) offers survey articles that discuss advanced material but remain accessible to those outside philosophy of science. Essays in Part V (Applications to Other Disciplines: Archaeology and Anthropology, Astrophysics and Cosmology, and Physics) address specific issues, in particular, scientific disciplines, including the applicability of various models of explanation.

The Book of Evidence

Peter Achinstein — 2003-11-01

Author:: Peter Achinstein
ISBN:: 9780195143898
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/0195143892.001.0001
Published in print:: 2001
Published Online:: 2003-11-01

What is required for a fact to be evidence for a hypothesis? In this book Achinstein introduces four concepts of evidence, which he calls potential, veridical, epistemic‐situation, and subjective. He defines the last three by reference to the first, and then characterizes potential evidence using a new objective epistemic interpretation of probability. The resulting theory is used to provide solutions to four ”paradoxes of evidence” (grue, ravens, lottery, and old evidence) and to a series of questions, including whether explanations or predictions furnish more evidential weight; whether individual hypotheses or only entire theoretical systems can receive evidential support (the Duhem‐Quine problem); and what counts as a scientific discovery and what evidence it requires. Two historical scientific cases are examined using the theory of evidence developed: Jean Perrin's argument for molecules (did he have noncircular evidence for their existence?), and J.J. Thomson's argument for electrons (what sort of evidence did this argument provide?).

Beyond Evolution

Anthony O'Hear — 2003-11-01

Author:: Anthony O'Hear
ISBN:: 9780198250043
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/0198250045.001.0001
Published in print:: 1999
Published Online:: 2003-11-01

The theory of evolution may be successful in explaining natural history, but it is of limited value when applied to the human world. Because of our reflectiveness and rationality, as embodied in language, we give ourselves ideals that cannot be justified in terms of survival‐promotion or reproductive advantage. Evolutionary theory is unable to give satisfactory accounts of such distinctive features of human life as the quest for knowledge, our moral sense, and the appreciation of beauty. At most, it can account for their prefiguration at some earlier stage of development than the human. In all these areas we transcend our biological origins, and such mechanisms as genetic survival, kin selection, reciprocal altruism, and sexual selection. But because of our rationality we can also transcend our cultural inheritance explanation of which in terms of memes is both hollow and misleading. We are rooted both in our biology and in our cultural inheritance; but, sociobiology and sociology notwithstanding, we are prisoners neither of our genes nor of the ideas we encounter as we each make our personal journey through life.

The Advancement of Science

Philip Kitcher — 2003-11-01

Author:: Philip Kitcher
ISBN:: 9780195096538
Publisher:: Oxford University Press
Subjects:: Philosophy, Philosophy of Science
DOI:: 10.1093/0195096533.001.0001
Published in print:: 1995
Published Online:: 2003-11-01

The Advancement of Science attempts to understand the notions of scientific progress, scientific objectivity, and the growth of knowledge by taking up the challenges that have been issued by scholars in the history and sociology of science. Begins from an outline of classical views in philosophy of science and explains how those views were confronted with apparently problematic examples from scientific practice past and present. Then builds an account of science that emphasizes the ways in which socially situated scientists can gain objective understanding of the world.