This book emphasizes the role of competing strategic beliefs in the formulation of British nuclear strategies between 1945 and 1964. Based on recently released documents, the British approach to nuclear weapons during this formative period was characterized by paradox and ambiguity. The paradox was that while there was a widespread consensus in political and military circles in favour of nuclear deterrence, there were constant disagreements over the requirements of an effective deterrent policy. These conflicts are centred on six main issues: whether deterrence was best achieved through ‘punis ... More

This book emphasizes the role of competing strategic beliefs in the formulation of British nuclear strategies between 1945 and 1964. Based on recently released documents, the British approach to nuclear weapons during this formative period was characterized by paradox and ambiguity. The paradox was that while there was a widespread consensus in political and military circles in favour of nuclear deterrence, there were constant disagreements over the requirements of an effective deterrent policy. These conflicts are centred on six main issues: whether deterrence was best achieved through ‘punishment’ or ‘denial’; whether deterrence necessitated nuclear superiority; whether preparations had to be made for a long war or a short war; what strategic implications followed the nuclear stalemate; whether limited nuclear wars could be fought without escalation to all-out nuclear war; and whether pre-emption was politically acceptable and militarily necessary. Indeed, the failure of successive governments to provide clear political direction on these issues meant that British nuclear strategy was more ambiguous and much less coherent than is usually supposed.