When we try to remember whether we left a window open or closed, do we actually see the window in our mind? If we do, does this mental image play a role in how we think? For almost a century, scientists have debated whether mental images play a functional role in cognition. The Case for Mental Imagery presents a complete and unified argument that mental images do depict information, and that these depictions do play a functional role in human cognition. It outlines a specific theory of how depictive representations are used in information processing, and shows how these representations arise f ... More

When we try to remember whether we left a window open or closed, do we actually see the window in our mind? If we do, does this mental image play a role in how we think? For almost a century, scientists have debated whether mental images play a functional role in cognition. The Case for Mental Imagery presents a complete and unified argument that mental images do depict information, and that these depictions do play a functional role in human cognition. It outlines a specific theory of how depictive representations are used in information processing, and shows how these representations arise from neural processes. To support this theory, it weaves together conceptual analyses and the many varied empirical findings from cognitive psychology and neuroscience. In doing so, the book presents the conceptual grounds for positing this type of internal representation, summarizing and refuting arguments to the contrary. Its argument also serves as a historical review of the imagery debate from its earliest inception to its most recent phases, and provides evidence that significant progress has been made in our understanding of mental imagery. In illustrating how scientists think about one of the most difficult problems in psychology and neuroscience, this book goes beyond the debate, to explore the nature of cognition and to draw out implications for the study of consciousness.