Moore and the Idea of Goodness
This chapter elaborates on the main thesis pursued in this study: “Are there things we should value because they are, quite simply, good?”. Moore gives an unequivocally affirmative answer to the question; he goes beyond saying yes, adding that goodness is the only property that can justify what we do and that we must bring about as much goodness as we can. The chapter expresses a rejection of “absolute goodness” not because we should shun it and seek absolute badness instead, but because there is doubt that the property of absolute goodness, as Moore understands it, has a useful role to play in moral philosophy or in everyday practical thinking.
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