Vagueness, Metaphysics, and Objectivity
One much discussed issue concerns the metaphysical nature, or the source or cause, of vagueness. Is vagueness a purely linguistic matter, concerned (merely) with how the world gets represented via language, or is there a sense in which the world itself is vague? This chapter argues against the intelligibility of the question of metaphysical vagueness, at least if it is put in such a straightforward and perhaps naive manner. Reflection on the origins and nature of vagueness in language suggests that the phenomenon is due to both the way the world is and the way that we, the users of language, and our faculties of representation are, and that there is no sense to separating those factors and attributing vagueness to one of them exclusively.
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