Matters of Taste
A likely place to look for relative truth appears to be in matters of taste. For example, detailed conceptions of who is handsome, who sexy, what is hip, or what is boring typically differ. One person's judgment of who is sexy, hip, or perverted seems to answer to their considered opinions on the matter; likewise for another person$#x0027;s. But they nonetheless will argue about whether someone is sexy, whether a certain activity is perverted — they take themselves to disagree, and think the disagreement (sometimes) worth argument. This chapter argues that this is not the best way of thinking of these matters. The primary reason is because while people recognize that they may disagree about these things, they also acknowledge that in (some) such matters neither of those who disagree need be making a mistake. And this is not something that the relativist — at least not the relativist of Chapter 4 — thinks possible. The chapter defends the intelligibility of disagreeing with someone about a matter of taste while allowing that those with whom one differs are not making a mistake about the matter.
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