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When Truth Gives Out$

Mark Richard

Print publication date: 2008

Print ISBN-13: 9780199239955

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2008

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239955.001.0001

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(p.177) References

(p.177) References

Source:
When Truth Gives Out
Publisher:
Oxford University Press

Bibliography references:

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