Things that could not happen without being experiences
This chapter discusses the sense it requires the experiencer to be ‘the conscious subject’ of the event, when the event is the sort of thing that is mentioned here. It suggests that the answer which is accepted here is that it does not in this type of case require consciousness of the event itself. It is enough if the event consists in or involves consciousness of something else. This widely held view is tested in three types of case, and the discussion narrows to a preliminary exploration of the sense or senses in which we may be said to experience seeing. Still under the general heading of events of which one is the subject, the chapters come properly to things you 2-experience, or Type Two cases, as the chapter calls them. They are non-probingly defined or demarcated, intending some sort of indistinct contrast with Type One cases, things you 1-experience.
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