Pleasure as a Conditional Good in the Phaedo
This chapter begins with a discussion of the view that Plato defends asceticism in the Phaedo. It argues that this view rests on the mistaken assumption that, for Plato, pleasure is bad in its own right, and not in virtue of one's giving it the wrong place in one's life. It is also argued that in the Phaedo, Plato also rejects the hedonist view that pleasure is the good, since taking pleasure to be the good is incompatible with the sorts of priorities one needs in order to make any kind of good out of pleasure in the first place. The chapter concludes by showing how the notion of a conditional good affords a new and richer understanding of Plato's discussion of pleasure and value in the Phaedo.
Keywords: pleasure, good life, Plato, virtue, hedonist view
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