AUTHORSHIP, INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE
Although intentionalism is often wrongly said to entail individualist dogma, the recognition of intentions is crucial to the recognition of diverse forms of authorship, including various kinds of collaborative and collective art-making. Livingston critiques Foucauldian contentions about authorship and proposes an alternative account on the basis of the author’s production of works with expressive or communicative intent. An elucidation of conditions on joint-authorship is proposed with reference to philosophical analyses of joint and collective action. Not all cases of collective art-making amount to joint authorship in the sense of a sufficiently well coordinated and genuinely collaborative effort.
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