Signification and Thought
In De Anima, Aristotle develops an analogy between perception and thought. This is based, I argue, on his account of what causally determines the object (or content) of the relevant perception or thought. I examine (1) how his account accommodates visual error and erroneous thoughts and (2) the analogy between the role of light in colour perception and the Active Intellect in the case of thought. Aristotle's account of the object of thought in De Anima supports his account of the signification of names in De Interpretatione. This supports claim (1) in Ch. 4.
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