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Libertarian Accounts of Free Will$
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Randolph Clarke

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780195159875

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005

DOI: 10.1093/019515987X.001.0001

Deliberative Libertarian Accounts

Chapter:
(p.57) 4 Deliberative Libertarian Accounts
Source:
Libertarian Accounts of Free Will
Author(s):

Randolph Clarke (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/019515987X.003.0004

Deliberative libertarian accounts allow that basic free actions may be causally determined by their immediate causal antecedents; indeterminism is required only at earlier points in the processes leading to free actions. Accounts of this type proposed by Daniel Dennett, Laura Ekstrom, and Alfred Mele are examined here. Given the assumption of incompatibilism, deliberative accounts fail to provide for the sort of difference-making that is distinctive of free action. Further, they fail to evade the problem of diminished control that they are meant to evade.

Keywords:   control, Daniel Dennett, deliberative libertarian accounts, difference-making, diminished control, Laura Ekstrom, free action, indeterminism, Alfred Mele

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