“Actin' Funny, But I Don't Know Why” The Explanatory Gap
The problem of the explanatory gap is introduced. First, a survey of various theories of scientific explanation reveals that deductive inference plays a crucial role in explanation. Then it is argued that the conceivability of zombies, among other things, demonstrates that we cannot explain conscious experience in terms of underlying physical and functional properties. Finally, an objection to the effect that we do not need to explain identity claims is dealt with.
Keywords: conceivability, explanatory gap, functional property, identity, scientific explanation, zombie
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