Thermonuclear Weapons and British Strategy 1954–1955
The introduction of the thermonuclear devices in Britain weighed in the idea that nuclear weapons were obstacles to war and that they constituted a threat to the security of mankind. Even though this claim is true, the British government, though seemingly discouraged at first, continued testing their thermonuclear weapons, which was inspired by the drills conducted in the United States and Soviet Union. This practical examination was accompanied by the remodelling of the British strategic frameworks in accordance with the modifications in the Global Strategy Papers of 1952 and 1954, as well as the ‘June Directive’. In spite of the attempt to integrate theory with its application and vice versa, there was still a failure to achieve a coherent nuclear strategy.
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