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Responsible BeliefA Theory in Ethics and Epistemology$
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Rik Peels

Print publication date: 2017

Print ISBN-13: 9780190608118

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2016

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190608118.001.0001

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Responsible Belief Is Compatible with Doxastic Luck

Responsible Belief Is Compatible with Doxastic Luck

Chapter:
(p.199) 6 Responsible Belief Is Compatible with Doxastic Luck
Source:
Responsible Belief
Author(s):

Rik Peels

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190608118.003.0007

This chapter considers the doxastic excuse of luck. An event is lucky for someone if it is beyond her control, of significance to her, and such that it could easily have failed to occur. Four kinds of luck often lead to doxastic luck: mechanism luck, evidential luck, aretaic luck, and consequential luck. To the extent that they excuse, they are reducible to force or ignorance. The possibility of consequential luck shows that one is blameworthy for a belief only if it is non-accidentally related to the violation of one’s intellectual obligation. A solution to the problem of doxastic luck is provided. The problem is that it seems that we are sometimes blameworthy for a belief, that doxastic luck is incompatible with doxastic blameworthiness, and that what we believe is virtually always a matter of luck. The problem is solved by distinguishing between the scope and degree of doxastic blameworthiness.

Keywords:   aretaic luck, consequential luck, control, degree of blameworthiness, doxastic luck, evidential luck, excuse, mechanism luck, scope of blameworthiness

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