Mixed-Member Electoral Systems
The Best of Both Worlds?
Shugart, Matthew Soberg University of California, San Diego
Wattenberg, Martin P. University of California, Irvine
Print publication date: 2003 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-925768-3







doi:10.1093/019925768X.003.0008

Steven R. Reed
Michael F. Thies
Abstract: This chapter, on the causes of electoral reform in Japan, reviews the movement from an extreme electoral (hyper-personalistic) system in which candidates of the same party competed against one another in three- to five-seat districts (in a single non-transferable vote system, SNTV) to a mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system that eliminated intraparty competition. It is argued that short-term act-contingent motivations played a necessary role in passing political reform, and that by January 1994, when the reform bills finally passed into law, no politician could publicly oppose political reform, even though some felt freer to grumble about it. The main sections of the chapter are: The Pathologies of SNTV: Who Hated What?; A Brief History of Failed Electoral Reform Efforts—1956 to 1991; The Fall and Rise of the LDP (Liberal Democratic Party): Electoral Reform in 1993–4; Analysis: The Causes of Electoral Reform.

Keywords: electoral history, electoral reform, electoral systems, extreme electoral systems, hyper-personalistic systems, Japan, Liberal Democratic Party, mixed-member electoral systems, mixed-member majoritarian systems, party competition, single non-transferable vote system,

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Part I Placing Mixed-Member Systems in the World of Electoral Systems
Part II Origins of Mixed-Member Systems
Part III Consequences of Mixed-Member Systems
Part IV Prospects for Reform in Other Countries