Abstract: The European Union is composed of its member states, yet these states have created and delegated increasing powers to a number of supranational organizations, including the executive Commission, the European Court of Justice and the European Parliament. Drawing from principal-agent analyses of delegation, agency and agenda setting, this book seeks to analyse and explain the delegation of powers by governmental principals to supranational agents, as well as the subsequent role played by those agents in the process of European integration. The book is divided into two parts. The first part of the book analyses the historical and functional patterns of delegation to the Commission, the Court of Justice and the Parliament, suggesting that delegation to the first two is motivated by a desire to reduce the transaction costs of policy-making, as predicted by principal-agent models. By contrast, the delegation of powers to the Parliament fits poorly with such models, and primarily reflects the concern of member governments to enhance the democratic legitimacy of the Union. The second part of the book focuses on the role of supranational agents in both the liberalization and re-regulation of the European market, and suggests that the Commission, Court and Parliament have played a causally important role alongside member governments as the ‘engines of integration’, but that their ability to do so has varied historically and across issue-areas as a function of the discretion delegated to them by the member governments.

Keywords: delegation, democratic legitimacy, discretion, European Commission, European Court of Justice, European integration, European Parliament, European Union, policy-making, principal-agent model