Political Institutions
Democracy and Social Choice
Colomer, Josep M. Professor of Political Science and Economics, Higher Council of Scientific Research and the Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona
Print publication date: 2001 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-924183-5







doi:10.1093/019924183X.003.0001

Josep M. Colomer
Abstract: Social choice theory helps to design a research strategy. Three institutional variables producing different degrees of stability and different amounts of social utility are: (1) the dispersion of voters’ preferences, corresponding to simple and complex electorates; (2) the inclusiveness of different voting and electoral rules; and (3) the number of issue dimensions in single and separate elections, corresponding to schemes of unity and division of powers.

Keywords: dispersion, division of powers, electoral rules, electorate, issue dimension, median voter, political equilibrium, social choice, social utility,

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