Edwards III, George C Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Texas A&M University
King, Desmond Andrew W. Mellon Professor of American Government and Professorial Fellow, University of Oxford
Print publication date: 2007 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-921797-7
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217977.003.0009
 

Lawrence R. Jacobs
Changes in governing norms and the development of institutional capacity and routines that foster public presidential promotion generate incentives and expectations for the presidents to overestimate their personal power and underestimate durable institutional and political constraints. The result is a tendency — especially on major programmatic initiatives — to squander leadership opportunities and to leave presidents in weakened political positions. This chapter examines the rise of presidential promotions and its impact on White House calculations by tracing changes in the White House's institutional capacity for reaching the public, a content analysis of presidential appeals is given, and comparative case studies of institutionally strong presidents — those who enjoyed the rare and advantaged position of unified party government are studied. The chapter's conclusion weighs the implications of what may be an emerging form of institutional Toryism — one that recalibrates the constitutional balance of authority under certain conditions and legitimizes a politically astute future Democratic president to use the new norms of governance for liberal ends.
Keywords: presidential promotion, institutional Toryism, presidential overreaching
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217977.003.0009
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Part I
Part II Decision Making
Part III
Part IV Building Congressional Coalitions