Edwards III, George C Distinguished Professor of Political Science, Texas A&M University
King, Desmond Andrew W. Mellon Professor of American Government and Professorial Fellow, University of Oxford
Print publication date: 2007 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-921797-7
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217977.003.0010
 

Scott B. Blinder
President Bush and administration officials sought to persuade the domestic public, lawmakers in Washington, and the international community of the need to take military action against Saddam Hussein's regime, even after the decision to go to war had apparently been made. Using the power of the presidential bully pulpit and sending high-ranking officials to the airwaves and speech circuits, the administration spared no effort to make the case for ‘disarming’ Saddam, by force if necessary. But was ‘going public’ — appealing to the American public to try to increase support for the president's preferred policy — a necessary or even useful step on the president's road to Baghdad? This chapter argues that ‘going public’ was useful in at least one sense: improving the president's chances of success in the Congress.
Keywords: Bush Administration, war, Iraq, public opinion, public appeals, presidential leadership
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199217977.003.0010
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Part I
Part II Decision Making
Part III
Part IV Building Congressional Coalitions