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Mendus, Susan
Professor of Political Philosophy, University of York
Print publication date: 2002 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-829781-9 |
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doi:10.1093/0198297815.003.0003
Abstract: In moral philosophy, the requirement of impartiality gives rise to the normative question, which is a question about why we should give priority to, and be motivated by, impartial concerns which conflict with the concerns we have for particular people or causes. In this chapter, discussion concentrates on those who already see the force of the requirements of impartial morality, but are sometimes tempted to ignore its demands. I suggest that, for such people, impartialism can command motivational priority only if it is seen as springing from our partial concerns and care for others. When impartialism is so grounded, it may also be commended to those who do not antecedently recognize its force.
Keywords: care, moral impartialism, morality, motivation, normative question, partiality, priority,
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