Mendus, Susan Professor of Political Philosophy, University of York
Print publication date: 2002 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-829781-9







doi:10.1093/0198297815.003.0002

Susan Mendus
Abstract: Impartialist political philosophy must show how and why the priority of impartial justice can be reconciled with a belief in the permanence of pluralism. Although the argument from epistemological abstinence explains the permanence of pluralism, it cannot explain why justice should have motivational priority. It delivers only, and at most, a modus vivendi defence of toleration. The way to attain a defence that is more than a modus vivendi is to ground political impartialism in moral impartialism.

Keywords: epistemological abstinence, justice, moral impartialism, motivation, pluralism, political impartialism, toleration,

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