Debating Democracy's Discontent
Essays on American Politics, Law, and Public Philosophy
Allen, Anita L. Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research and Scholarship
Regan, Milton C. JrProfessor of Law, both at the Georgetown University Law Center
Print publication date: 1998 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-829496-2







doi:10.1093/0198294964.003.0012

Andrew W. Siegel
Abstract: Political liberalism asserts that, in light of the fact of reasonable pluralism, the principles of justice which govern the basic social structure cannot be founded on a set of doctrines that some reasonable persons would not accept. For the political liberal, Sandel’s critique of the pervasiveness of the unencumbered self in legal discourse shows that we need to raise neutrality to a higher level, not that we need to relinquish it. One can oppose slavery and defend abortion rights while remaining neutral on moral and theological questions. Slavery is impermissible on the political conception of justice because it fails to recognize the political status of individuals who possess the properties of citizens and because it violates the principles which govern the fair terms of social cooperation among citizens. Although it appears that the political liberal must, in order to ward off metaphysics, denounce a constitutional right to abortion, she can preserve legal neutrality by leaving the issue of abortion rights to the states to decide.

Keywords: abortion, doctrines, metaphysics, moral, neutrality, pluralism, political, reasonable, slavery, theological,

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I Reviving Civic Virtue
II Toward an American Public Philosophy
III Liberal Republicanism
IV Living With Difference
V Law, Morals, and Private Lives
VI Self-Government and Democratic Discontent
VII A Reply to His Critics