Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb
Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945
Gaddis, John Robert Lovett Professor of History, Yale University
Gordon, Philip Director for European Affairs, National Security Council, Washington
May, Ernest Professor of History, Harvard University
Rosenberg, Jonathan Assistant Professor of History, Florida Atlantic University
Print publication date: 1999 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2004
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-829468-9
doi:10.1093/0198294689.003.0003
Vladislav M. Zubok
Stalin understood the military and political significance of atomic weapons and directed all available Soviet resources to obtaining this weapon. However, he remained largely a statesman operating on the premises and experience of the pre-nuclear age. For him, the emergence of atomic weapons made the prospect of a future war more terrifying, but no less likely. America's atomic monopoly in the first phase of the Cold War did not play a substantial role in deterring Stalin. He was determined to defend his spheres of influence and to dispel any sign of possible Soviet weakness in the face of America's atomic saber rattling. Stalin, a genius of state terror, power broking, and war diplomacy, was different from statesmen in the democratic countries, but his outlook on world politics was consistent with the realpolitik of the pre-nuclear age. He had as much inclination as some of his ’liberal’ Western counterparts to regard nuclear power as a means of augmenting military power and, in larger terms, the power of the state.
Keywords: Cold War, deterrence, diplomacy, nuclear parity, nuclear weapons, Soviet Union, spheres of influence, Josef Stalin, state power, USA,
doi:10.1093/0198294689.003.0003
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Part I Superpowers
Part II Allies