The Constitution of Agency
Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology
Korsgaard, Christine M. Harvard University
Print publication date: 2008 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-955273-3
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552733.003.0004
 

Christine M. Korsgaard
Plato and Kant advance a “Constitutional Model” of the soul, in which reason and passion have different functional roles in the generation of motivation, as opposed to Hume's “Combat Model” in which they are portrayed as independent sources of motivation struggling for control. The Constitutional Model makes it possible to explain what makes an action different from an event. What makes an action attributable to a person and therefore what makes it an action, is that it issues from the person's constitution and therefore from the person as a whole, rather than from some force working on or in the person. This implies an account of what makes an action good: it is chosen in a way that unifies the person into a constitutional system. Platonic justice and Kant's categorical imperative are shown to be normative standards for action because they are internal standards of action.
Keywords: action, categorical imperative, combat, constitution, internal standard, justice, Kant, passion, Plato, reason
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552733.003.0004
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Part 1 The Principles of Practical Reason
Part 2 Moral Virtue and Moral Psychology
Part 3 Other Reflections