The Constitution of Agency
Essays on Practical Reason and Moral Psychology
Korsgaard, Christine M. Harvard University
Print publication date: 2008 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2009
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-955273-3
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552733.003.0010
 

Christine M. Korsgaard
Hume thinks moral judgments are based on sentiments of approval and disapproval we feel when we contemplate someone from a “general point of view.” But why do we take up the general point of view? Hume argues that we take up the general point of view in order to avoid contradictions in our moral judgments, but this argument does not work because we do not make moral judgments until we take up the general point of view. This chapter proposes a different account. Hume argues that approval is a calm form of love, love of character, which sets a normative standard for other forms of love. The chapter argues that character, as a form of causality, is constructed from the general point of view. We take up the general view to view people as agents with characters, that is, as possible objects of love.
Keywords: approval, cause, character, general point of view, Hume, love, moral, normative, object, sentiment
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199552733.003.0010
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Part 1 The Principles of Practical Reason
Part 2 Moral Virtue and Moral Psychology
Part 3 Other Reflections