Price, A. W. Birkbeck College, University of London
Print publication date: 2008 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2008
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-953479-1
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534791.003.0002
 

A. W. Price
Practical judgements (such as ‘I must/ought to U+03C8’) are commonly to be understood relatively to a set of ends, quasi-ends (e.g., side-constraints), and circumstances. One can ask: necessary/fitting for what, in virtue of what? It may be true that I must U+03C8, in order to U+03C6, because my end is to U+03C6, although there is no necessity for me to U+03C6: necessities can be superficial. It is the agent's ends and quasi-ends that play a role in his own deliberations. Yet a speaker can invoke what ends and quasi-ends he likes, and say what the agent must/ought to do relatively to those. ‘Ought’s may be all-in, or pro tanto. The practical ‘ought’ is an operator upon predicates, not sentences. ‘Ought’ entails ‘can’ and ‘may’ relatively to a constant set of circumstances.
Keywords: must, ought, end, quasi-end, circumstances, relative
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199534791.003.0002
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