This chapter explores the difficult features of the negation problem for expressivism. The problem is outlined together with the set of tools available to expressivists in order to solve it. A-type and B-type inconsistency in mental states are introduced, and it is argued that only an appeal to A-type inconsistency and to inconsistency-transmitting attitudes could solve this problem by appeal to the kind of assumptions which expressivists will be able to discharge. It is proven, given an assumption implicit in all existing expressivist approaches that a formally adequate expressivist account must appeal to B-type inconsistency. The approaches of Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons, of Allan Gibbard, and Jamie Dreier, are criticized to illustrate why appeals to B-type inconsistency are unsatisfactory.
Keywords: A-type inconsistency, B-type inconsistency, inconsistency-transmitting attitudes, Terry Horgan, Mark Timmons, Allan Gibbard, Jamie Dreie,