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Schroeder, Mark
University of Southern California
Print publication date: 2007 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2008 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-929950-8 |
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doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199299508.003.0007
Abstract: This chapter advances a positive theory of the weight of reasons to replace Proportionalism, the thesis rejected in Chapters 5 and 6. First preliminary matters are set aside, in order to avoid an account that is too powerful and makes inappropriate predictions. The weight of reasons is accounted for by means of an ordering — the weightier-than ordering — on certain sets of reasons. Five attractive theses about the weight of reasons are motivated, including the Attractive Idea that the weight of a reason is the weight it is correct to place on it in deliberation, and the idea that correctness is itself to be analyzed in terms of the right kind of reasons to do something. A tension between these attractive theses is resolved by defending a recursive account of the weightier-than relation, and this account is used to argue that Hypotheticalism predicts the right results about cases so far considered.
Keywords: weight, Proportionalism, Attractive Idea, correctness, right kind of reasons, recursive account,
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