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Schroeder, Mark
University of Southern California
Print publication date: 2007 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2008 Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-929950-8 |
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doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199299508.003.0003
Abstract: This chapter continues the investigation of how it is that Ronnie's desire explains his reason. The Standard Model for normative explanations is introduced by way of an illustration. The Standard Model Theory is introduced, according to which all normative explanations follow the Standard Model, and it is shown that the Standard Model Theory is both substantive and interesting. Then it is shown that the Standard Model Theory licenses an argument that the Humean Theory of Reasons is literally incoherent and, failing that, an argument that it is objectionably Chauvinist. Several arguments are advanced against the Standard Model Theory. In the final section, the idea that the Humean Theory of Reasons should be understood as an analysis of reasons is motivated by reference to a Revived version of the Chauvinism objection. This leads to the proposal that Hypotheticalism is a version of reductive realism about the normative.
Keywords: Standard Model, Standard Model Theory, incoherence arguments, Chauvinism objection, Revived Chauvinism objection, analysis, reductive realism,
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