Sosa, Ernest Rutgers University, New Jersey
Print publication date: 2007 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-929702-3
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297023.003.0005
 

Ernest Sosa
This chapter presents a more developed defence of the account of knowledge than that offered in Chapter 2, which exploits the animal/reflective distinction towards solving traditional sceptical problems.
Keywords: intellectual virtue, epistemic luck, intellectual credit, apt belief, animal/reflective, sensitivity, sources of knowledge, epistemic deliverances
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199297023.003.0005
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