Better Never to Have Been
The Harm of Coming into Existence
Benatar, David University of Cape Town
Print publication date: 2006 (this edition)
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2007
Print ISBN-13: 978-0-19-929642-2
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199296422.003.0005
 

David Benatar
The conclusions of the previous chapters are applied to the abortion question. Four kinds of interests are distinguished: functional, biotic, conscious, and reflective interests. It is argued that beings are morally considerable only when they have at least conscious interests. Because consciousness only arises in human foetuses quite late in gestation (around 28-weeks), people do not come into existence (in the morally relevant sense) until at least that time. Thus, given the harm of coming into existence, it is wrong not to abort a foetus in the earliest stages of gestation. The ‘pro-death’ argument is then defended against two famous arguments that abortion is wrong — Richard Hare's ‘golden rule’ argument and Don Marquis' ‘future-like-ours’ argument.
Keywords: abortion, interests, consciousness, foetus, golden rule, Hare, future-like-ours, Marquis
doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199296422.003.0005
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